This article has been written by Kilimi Praneeth Reddy a law student pursuing the B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) program at Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University (RMLNLU), Lucknow.
Abstract
The recent developments in Indian constitutional and legal jurisprudence reflect a judiciary that is simultaneously addressing questions of procedural fairness, substantive rights, and institutional balance. The Supreme Court’s refusal to interfere in the Vantara wildlife import case underscores judicial restraint in matters already examined through investigative mechanisms, while also recognising that unnecessary intervention may itself result in harm. In the realm of criminal justice, the Court has emphasised that representation through an amicus curiae must be meaningful, requiring prior intimation to the convict to ensure fairness in appellate proceedings.
Further, the Court’s ruling on foreign divorce decrees reinforces the centrality of natural justice, holding that mere technical compliance with foreign procedures is insufficient without effective participation of the affected party. At a constitutional level, the debate surrounding Articles 32 and 226 has been revisited, with the Court informally discouraging direct access to the Supreme Court while leaving unresolved the long-standing question of whether these remedies are concurrent or sequential. Most significantly, the reservation of judgment by a nine-judge Bench on the definition of “industry” marks a critical moment in labour jurisprudence, with the potential to recalibrate the balance between worker protection and State functions. Collectively, these developments illustrate an evolving judicial approach that seeks to reconcile efficiency, fairness, and constitutional guarantees.
Keywords: Natural Justice, Article 32, Article 226, Labour Law, Industry Definition, Amicus Curiae, Foreign Judgments, Supreme Court
“Protection Beyond Permissions: Supreme Court on Animal Welfare, Finality of Imports, and Limits of PIL Intervention”
In a significant ruling balancing animal welfare, environmental governance, and judicial restraint, the Supreme Court of India dismissed a Public Interest Litigation challenging the import of animals by Vantara-linked entities, holding that once imports are made under valid statutory permissions, they cannot be reopened merely on subsequent objections.
The judgment was delivered by a Bench comprising Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria in Karanartham Viramah Foundation v. Union of India (2026 LiveLaw (SC) 266).
The Court further made an important observation that disturbing animals after lawful import may itself amount to cruelty, thereby shifting focus from procedural objections to the welfare of living beings.
What Actually Happened?
The petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution alleging violations of international wildlife trade norms, particularly under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).
The petitioner sought multiple directions, including:
- Disclosure of import/export records and CITES permits
- Constitution of an independent monitoring committee
- Action under the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972
- A temporary ban on further imports by private entities
The allegations were directed against entities associated with Vantara, including:
- Greens Zoological Rescue and Rehabilitation Centre
- Radha Krishna Temple Elephant Welfare Trust Court’s Key Findings
The Supreme Court refused to entertain the petition and held that the issue had already been examined in an earlier case, namely CR Jaya Sukin v. Union of India, where a Special Investigation Team (SIT) conducted a detailed inquiry.
The Court observed:
“The subject matter of the petition is substantially the same… the SIT report, accepted by this Court, clearly records that no violation of domestic or international law was found.”
The Court also noted that even the CITES document relied upon by the petitioner:
Did not support the allegations and confirmed that proper documentation and permissions existed.
Finality of Lawful Import
A crucial legal principle laid down by the Court was regarding the finality of administrative approvals.
The Court held:
“Once an import has been effected under valid permission, the same cannot subsequently be treated as prohibited merely because objections were raised thereafter.”
Relying on East India Commercial Co. Ltd. V. Collector of Customs, the Court reaffirmed that:
- Administrative approvals, once validly granted and acted upon, attain finality
- They cannot be casually questioned or reversed Animal Welfare: A Central Concern.
In one of the most significant observations of the judgment, the Court shifted focus to the welfare of animals and held:
“Disturbing the settled environment, custody and air of living animals, including rescued animals after lawful import, may itself result in cruelty.”
This highlights that:
- Judicial intervention must not harm the very subjects it seeks to protect
- Stability and care of animals take precedence over procedural challenges
Judicial Approach Towards PILs
The Court also reflected a cautious approach towards PIL jurisdiction, particularly when:
- Issues have already been examined
- Findings have attained finality
- No new substantial material is presented This reinforces that PILs cannot be used to:
- Reopen settled issues
- Create uncertainty in administrative decisions Present Position and Importance
The dismissal of the petition signifies that:
- The legality of Vantara-related imports stands confirmed
- Prior judicial findings (SIT report) retain finality
- Courts will not entertain repetitive or overlapping PILs More importantly, the judgment underscores:
- The importance of animal welfare in judicial reasoning
- The need to balance environmental concerns with legal finality
Conclusion
The decision of the Supreme Court of India in Karanartham Viramah Foundation v. Union of India marks an important step in reinforcing the principles of judicial restraint, administrative finality, and animal welfare. By refusing to reopen an issue already examined and accepted, and by emphasising that disturbance to lawfully imported animals may itself constitute cruelty, the Court has ensured that legal processes do not undermine humanitarian and ecological considerations.
This judgment reflects a balanced approach where law, environmental protection, and compassion for living beings are harmoniously integrated.
“Fair Trial Beyond Formality: Supreme Court on Notifying Convicts Before Appointing Amicus Curiae”
In a significant ruling reinforcing the principles of fair trial and meaningful legal representation, the Supreme Court of India has advised that appellate courts should notify a convict before appointing an amicus curiae to represent them in criminal appeals when their counsel is absent. The judgment was delivered by a Bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma in Bhola Mahto v. State of Jharkhand (2026 LiveLaw (SC) 265). The Court emphasised that legal aid must be real and meaningful, and not a mere formality, thereby strengthening procedural safeguards in criminal appeals.
What Actually Happened?
The case arose from a criminal appeal filed by the appellant against his conviction under Section 302 IPC. The appeal remained pending before the High Court for over two decades, during which the appellant was released on bail.
When the appeal was finally listed in 2024:
- No counsel appeared on behalf of the appellant
- The High Court appointed an amicus curiae
- The amicus argued the case and secured partial relief
°Conviction reduced from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC
However, before the Supreme Court, the appellant contended that:
- He was not informed about the absence of his counsel
- He was not notified about the appointment of the amicus
- His original grounds of appeal were not argued What Did the Supreme Court Say?
The Supreme Court acknowledged that although the High Court acted with the intention of expediting justice, there was a procedural lapse.
The Court observed:
“Justice would have been better served if an intimation by way of notice had been sent to the appellant.”
It further emphasized:
“Legal aid must be real and meaningful and not a token gesture or an idle formality.”
The Court clarified that while the High Court was not legally bound to notify the appellant, such notice would have ensured fairness and avoided later grievances.
Procedural Guidelines Laid Down
Building upon earlier jurisprudence, the Court laid down a structured framework: Firstly, when an appellate court proposes to appoint an amicus:- It should issue a notice to the convict at the address mentioned in the appeal
- The notice may be served through the jurisdictional police station Secondly:
- The convict should be informed that he may contact the amicus
- Provide instructions for effective representation Thirdly:
- If the convict wishes to engage his own counsel, the Court may hear:
- His counsel in addition to the amicus Fourthly:
- If the convict cannot be traced or refuses notice:
Service by pasting notice at the address will be sufficient
- Finally:
- If the convict still does not respond:
°The Court may proceed to decide the appeal This framework ensures that:
- Fair opportunity is given
- Delay tactics are prevented Court’s Concern on Misuse of Bail
The Court also made a strong observation regarding convicts released on bail:
“Convicts, after obtaining suspension of sentence, often fail to cooperate and become untraceable, thereby delaying proceedings.”
It emphasised that such conduct:
- Must be dealt with firmly by courts
- Should not obstruct the administration of justice Linked Precedent
The Court relied on Anokhi Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, where it was held that:
- Legal representation must be effective
- Experienced advocates must be appointed in serious criminal cases
The present judgment builds upon this by ensuring that: •The accused is also informed and involved in the process
Court’s Final Decision The Supreme Court:
- Set aside the High Court judgment
- Revived the appeal for fresh hearing (de novo)
- Directed that the appellant be:
°Given proper opportunity
°Allowed to be represented by his own counsel The Court also restored:
- The appellant’s bail status Present Position and Importance
This judgment is highly significant because it:
- Strengthens fair trial rights under criminal law
- Ensures that legal aid is meaningful, not symbolic
- Balances:
°Rights of the accused
°Efficiency of courts It also prevents:
- Technical challenges in higher courts
- Misuse of procedural lapses
Conclusion
The decision of the Supreme Court of India in Bhola Mahto v. State of Jharkhand reinforces that fairness in criminal justice is not merely about representation, but about informed and effective representation. By advising courts to notify convicts before appointing an amicus curiae and by laying down a structured procedure, the Court has ensured that the right to legal aid remains substantive and meaningful.
This judgment strikes a careful balance between expeditious disposal of cases and the foundational requirement of fairness in criminal adjudication.
“No Divorce Without Due Process: Supreme Court on Validity of Foreign Decrees and the Requirement of Meaningful Participation”
In a significant ruling on private international law and principles of natural justice, the Supreme Court of India has held that a foreign divorce decree cannot be recognised in India, unless the affected party had a meaningful opportunity to participate and contest the proceedings. The judgment was delivered by a Bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta in Kishorekumar Mohan Kale v. Kashmira Kale (2026 LiveLaw (SC) 259).
The Court set aside the Bombay High Court’s decision which had upheld a divorce decree granted by a US court, thereby reaffirming the importance of natural justice and statutory conditions under Indian law.
What Actually Happened?
The dispute arose from a marriage solemnised in Mumbai in 2005 between two Indian citizens who later resided in the United States. Following marital discord, the wife initiated divorce proceedings before a US court in Michigan in 2008.
Although the husband:
- Filed a written statement contesting jurisdiction
- Raised objections to the proceedings
He did not participate further in the trial. The US court granted a divorce in 2009 on the ground of “irretrievable breakdown of marriage”, along with financial directions.
Meanwhile, the husband approached the Pune Family Court under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which refused to recognise the US decree. However, the Bombay High Court reversed this decision and treated the foreign decree as binding. This led to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.
What Did the Supreme Court Say?
The Supreme Court rejected the validity of the foreign decree and held:
“The foreign decree is not conclusive and cannot be sustained as a valid decree of divorce between the parties.”
The Court emphasised that:
Mere service of summons is not sufficient; the party must have a meaningful opportunity and must effectively participate in the proceedings.
It found that:
- The husband did not voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction
- He did not participate in the trial on merits
- Therefore, principles of natural justice were violated Legal Framework: Section 13 CPC
The Court relied on Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which lays down when a foreign judgment is conclusive in India.
A foreign decree is not enforceable if:
- It is not given on merits
- It violates principles of natural justice
- It is based on a ground not recognised by Indian law Linked Precedent
The Court applied the landmark judgment in
- Narasimha Rao v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi, where it was held that a foreign divorce decree will be recognised only if:
- It is based on a ground recognised under Indian matrimonial law
- The opposite party:
- Voluntarily submits to jurisdiction
- Effectively contests the case
- Or consents to the decree.
The Court reiterated that:
“Principles of natural justice must be satisfied and effective participation is essential.”
Application to Present Case
Applying these principles, the Court found that:
- The ground of irretrievable breakdown is not recognised under the Hindu Marriage Act
- The husband did not effectively participate in proceedings
- There was no voluntary submission to jurisdiction
Thus, the foreign decree failed to satisfy the requirements of Indian law. Exercise of Article 142
Despite declaring the foreign decree invalid, the Court noted that:
- The parties had been separated for nearly 18 years
- The marriage had irretrievably broken down
To bring finality, the Court exercised its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution and:
- Granted a decree of divorce itself This ensured:
- Complete justice
- Avoidance of further litigation Present Position and Importance
This judgment is highly significant because it:
- Strengthens natural justice in cross-border disputes
- Protects parties from unfair foreign proceedings
- Clarifies the enforceability of foreign judgments in India
It also reinforces that:
- Indian matrimonial law cannot be bypassed
- Participation must be real and effective, not symbolic
Conclusion
The decision of the Supreme Court of India in Kishorekumar Mohan Kale v. Kashmira Kale reaffirms that the validity of foreign judgments in India depends not merely on their existence, but on the fairness of the process by which they are obtained. By insisting on meaningful participation and adherence to Indian legal standards, the Court has upheld the core principles of natural justice while also ensuring finality through its powers under Article 142.
This judgment serves as a crucial precedent in safeguarding rights in transnational matrimonial disputes.
“Concurrent, Not Conditional: Supreme Court’s Observations Rekindle Debate on Articles 32 and 226”
In a significant constitutional development, the Supreme Court of India has once again brought into focus the relationship between Article 32 and Article 226, observing that
petitioners should ordinarily approach High Courts before directly invoking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. These observations were made by a Bench led by Chief Justice of India Surya Kant while declining to entertain a petition filed under Article 32 concerning alleged hate speech by the Chief Minister of Assam.
The Court, while relegating the petitioner to the Gauhati High Court, orally deprecated the growing tendency of litigants to directly approach the Supreme Court without first exhausting remedies before the High Courts.
What Actually Happened?
A writ petition was filed directly before the Supreme Court under Article 32 seeking
directions in relation to alleged hate speech. Instead of entertaining the petition, the Court directed the petitioner to approach the High Court under Article 226.
In doing so, the Bench emphasised that:
- High Courts are equally empowered to enforce fundamental rights
- Direct invocation of Article 32 should not become a routine practice
This has revived an important constitutional question: Whether Articles 32 and 226 operate concurrently or sequentially
Constitutional Position: Article 32 vs Article 226
Article 32 provides a fundamental right to approach the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights, whereas Article 226 empowers High Courts to issue writs for:
- Fundamental rights
- Other legal rights
The Constitution envisages that:
- Both remedies exist simultaneously
- There is no mandatory requirement to approach High Courts first What Did the Supreme Court Say Earlier?
The leading precedent on this issue is
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, where the Court held:
“Article 32 provides a guaranteed remedy… this Court cannot refuse to entertain applications seeking protection of fundamental rights.”
This judgment clearly established that:
- Article 32 is itself a fundamental right
- It is not subject to any sequential limitation Similarly, in
Kavalappa Kottarathil v. State of Madras, the Court reaffirmed that:
- Remedies under Articles 32 and 226 are concurrent Departure from Established Position
Despite the clear constitutional scheme, certain later judgments have suggested a more sequential approach.
In Union of India v. Paul Manickam, the Court observed:
Petitioners should ordinarily approach the High Court first unless exceptional circumstances exist.
Similarly, in other cases, the Court has discouraged direct filing under Article 32, especially when:
- Alternate remedies are available
- No urgent or exceptional circumstances are shown
The present observations follow this trend of judicial restraint.
Debate from Constituent Assembly
The issue of whether jurisdiction should be sequential or concurrent was debated during the framing of the Constitution.
Benegal Narsing Rau had proposed that:
- Only High Courts should exercise writ jurisdiction initially
- The Supreme Court should act as an appellate body However, this view was rejected by:
- R. Ambedkar
- The Drafting Committee
The final Constitution clearly adopted a concurrent model, allowing individuals to directly approach either court.
Court’s Present Approach
The recent observations indicate that while:
- Article 32 remains a fundamental right The Court is increasingly:
- Encouraging litigants to approach High Courts first
- Managing its docket and workload
This reflects a practical approach, not necessarily a change in constitutional interpretation.
Need for Constitution Bench
Given the apparent inconsistency between:
- Early Constitution Bench judgments
- Recent smaller bench observations It has been argued that:
- Any reinterpretation of Articles 32 and 226 should be done by a Constitution Bench under Article 145(3)
Until then, the position laid down in Romesh Thappar remains binding.
Present Position and Importance
This issue is highly significant because it concerns:
- Access to justice
- Structure of judicial remedies
- Balance between Supreme Court and High Courts It also raises an important question:
Should convenience override constitutional design?
The recent observations of the Supreme Court of India have reignited a long-standing
constitutional debate regarding the relationship between Articles 32 and 226. While the Court’s emphasis on approaching High Courts first reflects practical concerns of judicial efficiency, it must be reconciled with the constitutional guarantee of direct access to the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights.
Until a definitive ruling by a Constitution Bench, the position that Articles 32 and 226 operate concurrently continues to hold the field, preserving the fundamental right of individuals to directly seek constitutional remedies.
“Revisiting ‘Industry’: Supreme Court’s G-Judge Bench Reserves Judgment on the Legacy of Bangalore Water Supply Case”
In a landmark constitutional development with far-reaching implications for labour law and State functions, the Supreme Court of India has reserved its judgment on the correctness of the expansive definition of “industry” laid down in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa.
The matter was heard by a G-Judge Constitution Bench headed by Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and comprising Justices B.V. Nagarathna, P.S. Narasimha, Dipankar Datta, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma, Joymalya Bagchi, Alok Aradhe, and Vipul M. Pancholi. The Bench has reserved judgment on whether the long-standing interpretation of “industry” under labour law requires reconsideration.
Background: The Bangalore Water Supply Case
- The 1978 judgment authored by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer laid down a very wide definition
- of “industry” under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
- The Court introduced the famous triple test, according to which an activity is an “industry” if:
- There is a systematic and organised activity
- Involving employer-employee cooperation
Importantly, the Court held that:
- Profit motive is irrelevant
- Even charitable, welfare and non-commercial activities may qualify as “industry”
This interpretation significantly expanded labour protections—but also created long- standing controversy.
What Happened Now (2026 Development)?
The present reference arises from State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jai Bir Singh, where doubts were raised about the correctness of the Bangalore Water Supply ruling.After multiple references (2005 – 2017), the issue finally reached a G-Judge Bench, which has now:
- Heard detailed arguments
- Examined the correctness of the 1G78 judgment
- °Reserved its judgment (March 1G, 2026)
Key Issues Before the Court
The Court is examining:
- Whether the triple test is legally correct
- Whether government welfare functions can be treated as “industry”
- What constitutes “sovereign functions”
- Impact of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020
Arguments Against the Bangalore Water Supply Judgment The Attorney General of India, R. Venkataramani, argued that:
The triple test is “logically sound but too broad and indiscriminate.”
He submitted that:
- Welfare and sovereign functions should not be treated as industry
- The current definition creates over-inclusion Similarly:
- Senior Advocate Shekhar Naphade argued that the definition was borrowed from foreign (Australian) law and may not suit Indian conditions
- It was also argued that the judgment was not truly unanimous
A key argument was the definition should align with the Industrial Relations Code, 2020, which excludes:
- Charitable activities
- Philanthropic services
- Sovereign functions
Arguments Supporting the Existing Definition
On the other hand, Senior Advocates like Indira Jaising and others strongly defended the Bangalore Water Supply judgment.
They argued:
- The Industrial Disputes Act is worker-centric legislation
- Labour protection must not be diluted
- Even charitable institutions involve labour exploitation concerns A powerful argument advanced was:
“Even if the employer is charitable, the labour involved is not charity.”
The amicus curiae also highlighted that:
- Employer-employee relationship alone cannot define “industry”
- But excluding large sectors may harm workers’ rights Judicial Concerns and Observations
The Bench actively engaged with:
- The over-expansion vs protection debate
- The need to balance:
°Worker welfare (Directive Principles)
°State functioning and governance It was also debated whether:
- Reversal of the judgment should be prospective or retrospective
- Whether decades of reliance on the existing definition would create legal instability Linked Precedents and Evolution
This issue has a long judicial history:
- Bangalore Water Supply case → Broad definition
- State of P. v. Jai Bir Singh → Doubt raised
- Later benches → Continued uncertainty
The present 9-Judge Bench is expected to finally settle this issue authoritatively. Present Status of the Case
- The judgment has been reserved
- No final ruling has been delivered yet
- The decision is awaited and will have nationwide impact Why This Case is Extremely Important
This case will determine:
- Scope of labour laws in India
- Whether government bodies are “industries”
- Balance between welfare state vs labour rights
- Interpretation of “sovereign functions” It may:
- Narrow or expand labour protections
- Redefine employer liability across sectors
Conclusion
The decision of the Supreme Court of India to reserve judgment in this matter marks a
critical moment in Indian labour jurisprudence. The reconsideration of the Bangalore Water Supply precedent reflects the Court’s attempt to reconcile evolving economic realities with constitutional commitments to social justice. Whether the Court narrows the definition of “industry” or retains its expansive scope, the outcome will significantly influence the future of labour rights, State functions, and industrial relations in India.
At present, the law remains unsettled, and the final verdict of the 9-Judge Bench is awaited.
Conclusion
The developments of the day reveal a judiciary navigating complex and often competing considerations within the legal framework. A common thread running through these decisions is the Court’s attempt to strengthen procedural fairness whether by ensuring meaningful legal representation, preventing undue interference with settled positions, or insisting upon genuine opportunity of hearing in transnational disputes. At the same time, the Court appears conscious of institutional limits, particularly in its reluctance to entertain certain petitions directly under Article 32.
The ongoing reconsideration of the Bangalore Water Supply doctrine stands out as the most consequential issue, as it has the potential to redefine the scope of labour law and the relationship between State functions and industrial activity. Alongside this, the Court’s emphasis on natural justice and fair process signals a continued commitment to core constitutional values.
Overall, these developments suggest that while the Supreme Court remains actively engaged in shaping the law, it is also exercising a degree of caution in areas involving broad policy implications. The trajectory indicates a judiciary that is striving to balance constitutional ideals with practical realities, though certain doctrinal questions particularly concerning access to remedies, continue to remain unsettled.