Constitutional Validity of Preventive Detention Laws

Likitha Sri Meka, Author

Preventive detention laws are an important tool for ensuring national security and public order through the detention of individuals without charges, inhibiting potential threats. Preventive detention laws present an important constitutional conundrum: a balance between individual freedom and the state’s duty to ensure security. The conflict between these competing interests calls for a close look at the legal and constitutional framework that regulates preventive detention.

This article examines the constitutional and jurisprudential underpinnings of preventive detention in India, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It examines the underlying principles of such legislation and how various jurisdictions have managed the tension between individual liberty and public security. In the Indian context, Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution form the constitutional basis for preventive detention, while statutory legislation such as the National Security Act, 1980, further refines its implementation. A comparison with the UK’s counterterrorist legislation and the US’s national security provisions reveals the diversity of approaches taken across the world.

The constitutional issues raised by preventive detention laws, especially in relation to due process, judicial review, and possible abuse, are analyzed through seminal judicial rulings. Indian courts, for example, have interpreted Article 22 to impose procedural protection, whereas A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India cases reflect the changing judicial approach to personal liberty.

The article aims to include a historical sketch of preventive detention, an exposition of major judicial precedents, a discussion on constitutional protection, and reform suggestions. Through careful examination of worldwide and domestic visions, it aspires to contribute to a sound understanding of preventive detention legislation and its implications on democratic government.

Keywords: Preventive Detention, Constitutional Validity, Article 22, National Security, Personal Liberty

Introduction

Preventive detention is a legal tool that enables the state to detain someone without a charge or trial, on the grounds that they are likely to pursue activities that endanger public order or national security. In contrast to punitive detention, which is applied as a penalty after a crime has been committed, preventive detention is a precautionary measure that seeks to forestall potential threats before they occur. Though its advocates believe it is vital to uphold law and order, it is considered by its critics to be an infringement of basic human rights, especially the right to liberty and due process.

Preventive detention is the imprisonment of a person by the state on the assumption that they can commit a future crime. It is founded on the principle of preemptive strikes and not retributive justice. Governments are defending its implementation in cases that relate to national security, terrorism, or disturbance of public order. It has been criticized often for avoiding the normal judicial processes, and issues have been raised about its misapplication for political or oppressive intentions.

Preventive detention in India has its roots in the colonial period. The British government passed a number of laws, including the Defence of India Act (1915) and the Rowlatt Act (1919), to suppress revolutionary movements by detaining people without trial. Following independence, preventive detention persisted under the Indian Constitution, which allows for it under Article 22. The Preventive Detention Act of 1950 was passed as a temporary measure but was subsequently replaced by more permanent legislation such as the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) in 1971 and the National Security Act (NSA) in 1980. These acts, along with other central and state legislations, remain to regulate preventive detention in India.

Punitive detention is when a person is arrested, tried, and convicted of having committed a crime, after due process of law. Preventive detention, however, does not need a crime to have been committed; it is suspicion-based and imposed without trial. The main aim of punitive detention is retribution and justice, while preventive detention is intended to prevent potential danger.

Preventive detention laws across the world differ in terms of scope and application. Most democratic countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, have preventive detention applied in terrorism and national security cases but with strict judicial control. Authoritarian regimes, however, tend to utilize it as a political repression tool. International human rights groups, such as the United Nations, stress the importance of due process and protections against abuse. While some nations have time limits and judicial review procedures, others permit indefinite detention under imprecise security legislation.

Constitutional Provisions Related to Preventive Detention in India

The Indian Constitution lays down a legal scheme for preventive detention but also has some safeguards built into it so that it does not become misused. The most applicable constitutional provision in this context is Article 22, which addresses protection against arbitrary detention and arrest. Article 22 makes a distinction between two forms of detention: punitive and preventive. Although it ensures basic rights like the right to be informed of the reasons for arrest and the right to legal counsel for those arrested in the normal course, it makes exceptions for preventive detention so that the state can detain a person without trial under certain circumstances.

The exact wording of Article 22(3) to 22(7) of the Indian Constitution lays down the framework for preventive detention:

(3) Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply—
(a) to any person who is for the time being an enemy alien; or
(b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention.

(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorize the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless—
(a) an Advisory Board consisting of judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for such detention.

(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.

(6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order to disclose facts which it considers to be against the public interest to disclose.

(7) Parliament may by law prescribe the circumstances and the class or classes of cases in which a person may be detained for a period longer than three months without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board.

While these provisions permit preventive detention, there are some procedural safeguards under the Constitution as well. One cannot be detained for more than three months unless an Advisory Board of judges examines the case and determines that there is adequate reason to continue detaining the individual. The detainee should be notified of the reasons for the detention, though authorities may deny revealing some particulars if they opine that this would be not in the interest of the general public. Secondly, though the detainees are eligible to present a representation against their detention, the same is not as a right to legal representatives.

The judiciary has ensured that the provisions of such powers are interpreted so as to equilibrate the power of the state and ensure protection for personal freedoms. The Supreme Court, in numerous rulings, has established that even as preventive detention is essential to protect national security and public order, it should not be wielded arbitrarily. In A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950), the Supreme Court originally affirmed the constitutionality of preventive detention laws, clarifying that Article 22 is a distinct code on detention and does not need to comply with the due process clause under Article 21. But in subsequent judgments like Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), the Court broadened the meaning of personal liberty under Article 21 and held that any law which impacts personal liberty should be fair, just, and reasonable.

The effect of these judicial readings has been substantial. Courts have maintained stringent adherence to procedural protection and have adjudicated against arbitrary arrests. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994), the Court highlighted that preventive detention statutes should be utilized cautiously and at the hands of judicial oversight. Equally, in President of India v. Bhanudas Krishna Gawde (1971), the Court ruled that procedural failures in conveying the grounds of detention would invalidate such detention.

Even with these checks and balances, there are fears of abuse of preventive detention acts, especially under laws such as the National Security Act (NSA) and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA). Detainees are regularly subjected to prolonged detention without trial, and there is very little scope for judicial oversight. Preventive detention is defended in extreme situations, but when used as a means of administrative expediency or political repression, it is antithetical to democratic values and constitutional rights.

Accordingly, while the Indian Constitution authorizes the state to detain people preventively, it also prescribes safeguards to avoid arbitrary deprivation of liberty. But judicial supervision and observance by the government of constitutional norms are necessary for the success of these safeguards. The continous controversy surrounding the need and abuse of preventive detention highlights the sensitivity of the balance between national security and individual liberty in a democratic state.

Judicial Scrutiny and Key Case Laws

The Indian judiciary has been instrumental in interpreting and streamlining the reach of preventive detention laws, treading a delicate balance between state power and individual freedom. Over the years, courts have undergone a transition from a narrow, literalistic method to a more liberal and rights-based interpretation of constitutional provisions. A number of landmark judgments serve to demonstrate this evolution.

In A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (AIR 1950 SC 27), the Supreme Court was in favor of a constricted vision on personal freedom and due process. A.K. Gopalan, who was a communist leader, was detained by virtue of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, but he was not notified of the reasons for the detention. This was challenged under Articles 19, 21, and 22 by him, citing preventive detention was encroaching into his basic rights. The Court held that Article 22 established a comprehensive code of preventive detention and that requirements of due process under Article 21 did not apply. The judgment supported broad powers of detention of the government but was criticized subsequently for limiting fundamental rights too strictly.

A more progressive shift came with Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (AIR 1978 SC 597), which expanded the scope of Article 21. Maneka Gandhi’s passport was impounded without adequate reasons, and she challenged the decision as arbitrary and in violation of her right to personal liberty. The Supreme Court reversed the restrictive approach in Gopalan and stated that any law encroaching on personal liberty must be reasonable, fair, and just. It connected Articles 14, 19, and 21 to ensure that liberty-limiting laws not only need to be procedurally valid but also substantively fair. The case heavily influenced preventive detention jurisprudence and necessitated detention laws to undergo tests of fairness and reasonableness.

In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569, the Supreme Court tested the validity of rigorous anti-terror legislation, namely the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA), enabling extended detention without trial. The Court affirmed the constitutionality of the law but emphasized that preventive detention should never be abused and must be wielded cautiously. It underscored that such exceptional measures need to be implemented strictly within the constitutional framework and should not usurp fundamental rights arbitrarily. The judgment underlined the conflict between national security and civil liberties, reiterating the necessity for judicial oversight.

The right to privacy, an important component of individual freedom, came under the spotlight in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1. In this historic case, the Supreme Court, unanimously, established the right to privacy as a constitutional right under Article 21. Although the case mainly involved Aadhaar and data protection, its consequence spread to preventive detention. The ruling confirmed that any interference with individual liberty, such as preventive detention, should satisfy the tests of proportionality and necessity. It highlighted that the ability of the state to detain citizens should not compromise their fundamental rights more than absolutely necessary and be supported by cogent state interests.

Evolution of judicial tendencies depicts a growing focus on safeguarding personal freedom while recognizing the state’s necessity for preventive action in exceptional circumstances. The courts initially adhered to a strict literal approach, as evident in Gopalan, enabling preventive detention legislation to run with minimal controls. With Maneka Gandhi, however, the judiciary enacted a wider interpretation of due process, guaranteeing equity in the use of state authority. Later judgments, including Kartar Singh, stressed the risks of uncontrolled preventive detention, whereas Puttaswamy re-emphasized privacy and individual liberty in the contemporary constitutional scheme.

In spite of these developments, preventive detention acts remain a big challenge. Procedural safeguards have been ordered by the judiciary, but abuse is always possible, especially in politically charged situations. The ongoing use of the National Security Act (NSA) and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) is questionable in terms of arbitrary detentions and insufficient judicial review. The judiciary has stepped in where there is manifest injustice, but the balance between national security and constitutional rights continues to be an issue of debate.

In all, judicial oversight has been crucial in developing preventive detention statutes in India. While initial decisions granted broad powers to the state, subsequent rulings have imposed necessary checks on excessive detentions. The judiciary’s changing approach reflects the imperative of constitutional equipoise where the security interests of the state are not allowed to overwhelm citizens’ freedoms.

Preventive Detention Laws in India: A Critical Analysis

Indian preventive detention laws have been the focus of heated controversy, considering their implications for personal freedom and their susceptibility to abuse. Although these laws are defended on national security and public order grounds, their enforcement has tended to raise issues of arbitrary detentions, lack of transparency, and executive excesses. Some of the most important preventive detention legislation in India are the National Security Act, 1980 (NSA), the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA), and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA).

The National Security Act, 1980 (NSA) is the most commonly utilized preventive detention law in India. It enables the government to hold people for 12 months without charges if they are considered a threat to national security or public order. The NSA provides sweeping powers to the executive, allowing detention on the basis of subjective satisfaction without the requirement of immediate judicial scrutiny. Although the Act establishes an Advisory Board to consider detentions, detainees have no right to legal representation before the Board. The critics contend that this legislation has been repeatedly abused to quell opposition, arrest political dissidents, and harass minority groups. Indications are that most detentions under the NSA do not result in charges being filed, causing concern regarding lack of accountability and monitoring.

The Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA) was enacted to check economic crimes, especially foreign exchange offenses and smuggling. It enables the authorities to arrest and detain suspected participants in unlawful economic activities without trial for one year. Although COFEPOSA was promulgated to combat economic challenges to national security, its wide-ranging provisions have frequently resulted in the arbitrary detention of traders and businesspeople, often for lack of adequate evidence. The transparency deficit in the process of detention and the long-term detention without trial continue to be major criticisms of the Act.

The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) is India’s principal anti-terrorism legislation, initially enacted to prevent secessionist and terrorist activities. It has since been extensively amended, especially through the 2019 amendments that enabled individuals (not merely organizations) to be identified as terrorists without a trial. The UAPA allows for the detention of individuals for long periods without charging them formally, and provisions relating to bail are extremely restrictive. The 2019 amendments further enhanced the power of the government to declare people as terrorists and freeze their assets with no oversight by the judiciary. The UAPA is criticized for its misuse to arrest journalists, activists, and political rivals on unsubstantiated charges of anti-national activities. The conviction rates of such cases under UAPA are still low, indicating that most detainees remain in prison for years without trial, contravening the basic rights.

The most urgent issues with these pieces of legislation are their abuse, opaqueness, and overreach by the executive. Because preventive detention does not involve formal charging and a trial, it has also been utilised as an instrument of political and administrative convenience instead of an actual security measure. Most of those arrested under these laws are released on bail after months or years, and this raises serious concerns regarding the necessity and proportionality of their detention. The secrecy involved in preventive detention orders also hinders accountability. In most instances, detainees are not told the precise reasons for their detention, which restricts them from challenging their imprisonment effectively. The wide discretion granted to the executive without sufficient judicial protection has resulted in cases of wrongful arrest, disproportionately impacting vulnerable communities and political activists.

Judicial intervention has sometimes offered relief in instances of gross abuse, but the judiciary has mostly upheld the constitutionality of such laws, affirming their necessity for national security. Courts have also insisted on procedural safeguards to avoid arbitrary detentions. Despite these judgments, the application of preventive detention laws continues to be problematic, with issues regarding overreaching state power and weak checks and balances.

Although preventive detention legislation has a legitimate purpose in ensuring national security and public order, its widespread and untrammelled use causes grave apprehensions about human rights abuses. Between national security and individual freedom, there is a need for a balance that may be provided by tighter judicial controls, increased transparency, and constraints on the arbitrariness of executive action. Unless effective reforms are initiated, preventive detention legislation shall remain a thorny issue in India’s politics and law.

Comparative Analysis with Other Jurisdictions

Preventive detention legislation is found in most nations, but the extent, application, and protection differ considerably. While some states prioritize security at the expense of civil rights, others have stringent checks to avoid arbitrary detention. A comparison of India’s model with other jurisdictions, such as the United States, United Kingdom, and European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), gives an understanding of various legal models and possible reforms India can embrace.

In the USA, preventive detention became very prominent after 9/11, especially through the Patriot Act (2001) and the Guantanamo Bay indefinite detention of terror suspects. The Patriot Act increased the surveillance and detention authority of the government, making it possible for authorities to hold non-citizens suspected of terrorism-related activity for up to seven days without charging them. Yet, under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) Act, foreign nationals, among others, may be detained indefinitely as “enemy combatants.” The detention facility at Guantanamo Bay became an international symbol of preventive detention, where detainees were kept in custody without trial, frequently being tortured using so-called harsh methods of interrogation. The U.S. Supreme Court, in cases such as Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004) and Boumediene v. Bush (2008), established that the detainees were entitled to contest detention, emphasizing judicial review as an important check. Still, Guantanamo Bay is not in the news without controversy, as many are kept for many decades without ever facing charges formally.

The United Kingdom has also applied preventive detention through anti-terror legislation, most notably the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. Passed in reaction to the 9/11 attacks, this act provided for the indefinite detention of foreign nationals on suspicion of terrorism. Yet, in A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2004), the House of Lords held that indefinite detention without trial contravened human rights. In response, the UK government substituted detention provisions with Control Orders (2005) and subsequently Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs, 2011), which put restrictions such as house arrest and electronic tagging in place of extended detention. This is indicative of the UK’s effort to reconcile security needs with legal protection, as opposed to India’s NSA or UAPA, which still permit extended detention without proper scrutiny.

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) guarantees robust protection against arbitrary detention through Article 5, which avers that “everyone has the right to liberty and security” and cannot be kept in detention without due process. Nations under the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) are compelled to provide good reason for preventive detention with clear legal justification and grant access to legal counsel for detainees. In instances such as A and Others v. United Kingdom (2009), the ECtHR held that indefinite detention of terror suspects was contrary to the ECHR, upholding the need for judicial scrutiny and time-limited detentions. The European system guarantees that even in national security scenarios, human rights are not compromised, a difference from India’s preventive detention practice, where judicial intervention is generally minimal.

Lessons India Can Learn from International Practices

India’s preventive detention laws would do well to draw lessons from best practices worldwide. To begin with, stringent judicial oversight as practiced in the UK and ECHR should be established to avoid detention without trial indefinitely. Courts need to have more robust review powers to prevent detentions from being politically or arbitrarily driven. Second, India must implement time-bound detention periods with regular judicial reviews, as in the UK’s TPIMs, instead of permitting extended incarceration under acts such as UAPA and NSA. Third, access to legal counsel is a must, as in the Hamdi v. Rumsfeld case, where the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed detainees’ right to contest detention. Lastly, checks on transparency and accountability should be instituted in the form of compulsory public reporting of detentions and independent review committees in order to forestall abuse.

Thus, although national security needs justify preventive detention to some extent, India has to ensure international checks to continue protecting human rights. Judicial review, detention for limited periods of time, and increased transparency can ensure that preventive detention is not a means of political oppression but a valid security measure.

Challenges and Need for Reform in Preventive Detention Laws

India’s preventive detention laws have, for years, been at risk of offending the basic human rights and paving the way for arbitrariness by the state. Although national security imperatives do require some curtailment of personal freedom, the sweeping and uncontrolled powers that have been provided under acts such as the National Security Act (NSA), Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), and Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (COFEPOSA) have sparked serious issues over their abuse and lack of accountability. A careful examination makes a compelling case for legal and procedural reforms.

One of the greatest issues with preventive detention laws is arbitrary detention and abuse of human rights. These laws enable the executive to imprison people without charges or trial for lengthy times on the basis of loose and subjective reasons. The absence of judicial review in the early stages makes it hard for detainees to question their detention. There are reports that the laws are routinely employed against political activists, journalists, and minorities in order to suppress democratic ideals. Furthermore, the detainees are usually not given any information on why they were detained, denying them an effective chance to defend themselves. This contravenes the dictates of natural justice, which state that all persons should be entitled to a hearing and an opportunity to defend themselves against allegations.

The judiciary’s role in safeguarding civil liberties has been a mixed one. Although courts have at times stepped in to restrain the abuse of preventive detention legislation, they have largely upheld their constitutionality. In instances such as A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950), the Supreme Court took a limited approach to personal liberty, permitting extensive executive discretion in preventive detention. But in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), the Court widened the ambit of Article 21, stressing that any limitation on personal freedom must be fair, just, and reasonable. More recently, in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), the Supreme Court reconfirmed the right to privacy as a fundamental right, stressing the requirement of proportionality in state action. Even with these liberal judgments, the courts have remained hesitant to quash preventive detention orders, exercising deference towards the executive branch in national security issues.

To counter these problems, a few legal and procedural checks must be instituted. For beginners, stronger judicial scrutiny should be required for reviewing detention orders at the earliest possible juncture. Autonomous tribunals or judicial panels should examine the necessity and proportionality of each detention. Second, more transparency is needed in the preventive detention process. Authorities should be compelled to give full reasons for detention so that detainees can challenge their imprisonment effectively. Third, time limits on detention periods should be strictly enforced to avoid indefinite imprisonment without trial. The institution of periodic judicial review can ensure that detentions are not arbitrary or excessive. Fourth, legal representation should be available to everyone detained so that they have the ability to oppose detention on a fair basis. Lastly, there should be mechanisms of accountability through parliamentary intervention or independent commissions to avoid abuse and politically motivated detentions.

Balancing security with basic rights is critical in a democratic society. Whereas it is in the interest of the state to prevent threats against national security, this should never be at the expense of civil liberties. International frameworks, including those under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), give us model examples of ways in which national security matters may be addressed while protecting human rights. India needs to shift towards a system in which preventive detention is resorted to only in the most extraordinary situations, with robust procedural protection.

Finally, while preventive detention is a valuable device to ensure public order, its unfettered use is highly objectionable from both constitutional and ethical perspectives. Immediate reforms must be initiated to prevent its abuse, ensure judicial control, and respect the ideals of justice and fairness. Only by securing a rights-focused, transparent, and accountable approach can India find a proper balance between national security and individual freedoms.

Conclusion

Indian preventive detention legislations have always been under great controversy, trying to balance the duty of the state to protect national security with the inherent rights of individuals. Although legislation like the National Security Act (NSA), Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), and Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (COFEPOSA) perform significant security roles, their application has frequently resulted in arbitrary arrest, non-transparency, and human rights abuse. The judiciary has served to interpret the laws, but its intervention has been patchy, sometimes sustaining executive power and, at other times, upholding due process and individual freedom.

Among the biggest issues with preventive detention laws is their abuse. The absence of judicial checks and process clarity has led to people being held in detention for extended periods without being tried fairly. In addition, such laws disproportionately impact marginalized groups, activists, and political opposition, and raise legitimate questions regarding their fairness and need. Judicial oversight, as observed in cases such as Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) and Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), has widened the ambit of personal freedom, but preventive detention laws still remain under wide and frequently untrammeled executive discretion.

In view of these issues, periodic examination and scrutiny of preventive detention laws are necessary. Independent judicial review committees, parliamentary checks, and human rights commissions must be actively engaged in reviewing the need and proportionality of detention orders. Time-limited detentions, compulsory reasons for detention to be disclosed, and ensured legal representation access need to be enforced to safeguard against these laws being abused. Also, international practices, including the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the UK Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs), provide valuable lessons on how security issues must be balanced with due process and legal protections.

In the end, a constitutional balance between security and fundamental rights can be attained only through a rights-based approach to preventive detention. The state’s interest in preserving law and order need not be paid for through sacrificing arbitrary executive action and undermining of civil rights. Through greater judicial scrutiny, improved transparency, and regular review through the courts of law, India can keep its preventive detention law just, reasonable, and equitable, faithful to the cause of democracy and the ideals of human rights. The aim should not be the repeal of such laws but their reform and proper application so that they are utilized only in the most exceptional cases with proper safeguards to prevent individual freedoms.

References

1. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27.
2. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
3. Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569.
4. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
5. A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56.
6. A and Others v. United Kingdom, 2009-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 353.
7. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
8. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
9. National Security Act, 1980, No. 65, Acts of Parliament, 1980 (India).
10. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, No. 37, Acts of Parliament, 1967 (India).
11. Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, No. 52, Acts of Parliament, 1974 (India).
12. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, c. 24 (U.K.).
13. Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, c. 23 (U.K.).
14. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (U.S.).
15. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (U.S.).
16. European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
17. United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35 on Liberty and Security of Person, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 (2014).