Jurisdiction Under Section 27 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

ayush chandra

3 months ago

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Harsh Vardhan Gupta, Author

A 2nd year law student at IILM University, Greater Noida Read More

Abstract;

Clarified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2025 and enforced by High Courts: Complaints can be filed where the aggrieved person resides, works, or where the violence occurred.

The article provides a critical analysis of the changing dynamics of jurisdiction under Section 27 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act)¹ and its implications in Indian courts. It begins by explaining the legislative goal of extending jurisdiction to Magistrates in the locations where the aggrieved woman resides, works, or conducts business. This provision aims to eliminate procedural obstacles that often hinder victims from pursuing legal action in unfamiliar or distant courts. The article uses a detailed examination of recent landmark rulings, including those from the Supreme Court and various High Courts, to demonstrate both the increased access to remedies and the new challenges that have arisen as a result.ⁱ

A major focus of the discussion is the issue of misuse, as some litigants intentionally file petitions in far-off jurisdictions to intimidate or pressure the other party. The article provides specific cases to illustrate how courts have sought to balance the protective intent of the DV Act with the necessity to prevent forum shopping and ensure fair trial conditions for all parties. By analysing cases like Dheeraj Gupta v. State (NCT of Delhi) and the Bombay High Court’s nuanced approach, the author highlights the conflict between victim-oriented justice and procedural integrity. The narrative also examines how Section 27 interacts with other procedural laws, emphasizing that jurisdiction is crucial to accessing justice, not merely a technicality.

In summary, the article calls for judicial awareness and possible legislative improvements to avoid the exploitation of this progressive jurisdictional provision, thereby protecting the DV Act’s goal of effective safeguarding while ensuring the rights of both parties are fairly upheld.

Over centuries, the position of women in society has been regarded as a genuine indicator of a nation’s advancement and cultural richness. Indian tradition and legal history consistently highlight that a society that safeguards and respects its women flourishes, whereas one that disregards them struggles. This idea is eloquently expressed in an ancient verse:

“Yatra Naryastu Pujyante Ramante Tatra Devata; Yatraitaastu Na Pujyante Sarvaastatrafalaah Kriyaah” ²

i.e., Where women are honoured divinity blossoms there, and where women get dishonoured, the actions remain unfruitful.ⁱⁱ

This ancient verse from the Manusmriti illustrates the profound respect and significance attributed to women in early Indian philosophy. Women were seen as the foundation of the family, bearers of cultural heritage, and caregivers for future generations. Yet, over the years, societal dynamics shifted, patriarchal values grew more entrenched, and the esteem, once held for women was frequently supplanted by discrimination and violence in the spaces that were supposed to safeguard them – their homes.

The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) was established against this backdrop. Its purpose is to acknowledge that domestic violence is not just a private issue but a societal wrong that infringes upon fundamental rights and human dignity. The Act offers civil remedies, including protection orders, residence orders, monetary support, custody arrangements, and compensation, all accessible through a judicial process.

What is Domestic Violence Act?

The Domestic Violence Act, formally referred to as the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005, was implemented by the Indian government in October 2006. The Act was originally passed by Parliament in August 2005 and received presidential assent in September of that year. By November 2007, four out of the twenty-eight state governments in India had ratified the Act. ³ ⁱⁱⁱ

This legislation was significant as it provided the first official definition of domestic violence in the country, a definition that has been utilized in thousands of civil and criminal court cases to prosecute individuals engaged in violent behaviours toward their spouses.

The DV Act, 2005 is the result of several combination of factors- Significant gaps in current legal solutions, India’s international obligations, and ongoing efforts by Women’s rights organizations have contributed to this situation. The passage of this law marks an important advance in acknowledging domestic violence as a societal issue and providing prompt civil protection for women. Some of the significant advancements that established the groundwork for this crucial legislation;

International Commitments (CEDAW)

India ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in, 1993.⁴

In 1992, the United Nations emphasized through General Recommendation No. 19 under CEDAW^iv that domestic violence constitutes a form of discrimination that governments must work to prevent and tackle. This international directive pressured India to establish specific laws aimed at protecting women from domestic violence, thereby aligning with global human rights standards.

Shortcomings in Existing Laws

Before 2005, women experiencing domestic violence had limited legal options, primarily relying on specific criminal laws like:

Section 498A IPC– Addressing cruelty by husbands or their relatives,
Section 304B IPC– ^vConcerning dowry deaths, or pursuing divorce or maintenance under personal laws.⁵

Although these laws penalized wrongdoers, but they lacked provisions for immediate civil relief, such as protection orders, rights to housing, or temporary financial assistance. Courts pointed out these deficiencies in multiple decisions, emphasizing the necessity for a more thorough approach that included protective and preventive measures in addition to punitive actions.

Judicial Insights and the Advancement of Complete Safeguards

In the case of Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi (AIR 1981 SC 746), ⁶ ^vithe Supreme Court determined that the right to life outlined in Article 21 encompasses the right to live with dignity and to be protected from any actions that may cause harm, injury, or disrupt the use of any body part or ability, even on a temporary basis. This principle is evident in the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act of 2005, which characterizes physical abuse as any action that causes bodily pain, harm, jeopardizes life, limb, or health, or negatively affects the physical or mental well-being of the affected woman. By adopting this broad definition, the Act safeguards a woman’s right to live free from violence in her home, thereby implementing the constitutional protection established in this context.

Similarly, In the case of Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab & Anr.⁷ (2011,12 SCC 588)^vii, the Supreme Court evaluated if a divorced woman could submit a complaint under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The Court highlighted that the DV Act was established as a form of social welfare legislation to give women immediate civil remedies, such as protection orders, rights to residence, and financial relief, which previous laws like Section 498A of the IPC did not provide.

Nevertheless, based on the circumstances of the case, the Court determined that because the couple was already divorced, there was no existing domestic relationship, making the complaint under the DV Act untenable.

This ruling is significant as the Court emphasized the aim and extent of the DV Act during its deliberation, recognizing that previous legislation was primarily punitive and did not provide adequate protection. It specified that the DV Act aims to address this deficiency, although it is applicable only when a domestic relationship is present at the time the complaint is filed.

Having covered the background and relevant legal precedents, we now turn to the primary focus of this article- the notion of jurisdiction and its application under Section 27 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.⁸

“Jurisdiction”⁹ refers to the legal authority granted to a court, tribunal, or other adjudicatory entity to hear, adjudicate, and render enforceable decisions on cases. It establishes the boundaries within which a judicial body can function, dictated by factors such as “subject matter,” “geographical area,” “financial stakes,” or the “parties involved.” Jurisdiction is established by law and cannot be claimed through consent or relinquishment. Any ruling made without proper jurisdiction is considered Null and Void.^viiiIn basic terms, it addresses an essential question in every legal case: Is this specific forum authorized to hear and decide this particular dispute or not.

Main obstacles in application of Section 27 of DV Act, 2005;

Although Section 27 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 was designed to provide extensive territorial jurisdiction for women affected by domestic violence, the judiciary has encountered numerous ongoing issues in its interpretation and implementation. These difficulties commonly arise during initial objections and interim hearings, leading to delays in legal proceedings. Key challenges include:

Defining “Residence”: Magistrates frequently struggle to determine whether a woman’s stay in a specific location should be classified as “permanent” or “temporary residence,” resulting in varied interpretations.
Forum Shopping Claims: Respondents often assert that complainants select far-off jurisdictions to gain an advantage, which prompts courts to examine the legitimacy of the chosen forum.
Overlapping Cases: Concurrent matrimonial or custody proceedings in different jurisdictions can lead to conflicts or redundant legal actions.
Delays Due to Jurisdictional Challenges: Jurisdictional objections are commonly presented as preliminary matters, causing delays in obtaining urgent reliefs as intended by the Act.
Inconsistency in Standards Among Courts: Various High Courts have established somewhat differing criteria for defining “temporary residence,” resulting in varied practices at the Magistrate level. This inconsistency generates uncertainty and can lead to unequal protection for victims.

As an illustration, in the case of Ram Kishan Singh v. Union of India & Anr. (W.P.(C) No. 7818/2008, 2013)¹¹, ^ixThe aggrieved woman relocated to Delhi from her marital home in Mumbai to enroll in a four-month diploma program and subsequently filed a complaint under the DV Act. The respondent contested the jurisdiction of Delhi, claiming that none of the supposed incidents of violence took place there and that her move was only temporary to manipulate jurisdiction- accusing her of forum shopping.

The Delhi High Court affirmed the legitimacy of Section 27 and stated that the phrase “permanently or temporarily resides” should be understood in a practical, victim-focused way. A person may be considered to live in multiple locations; temporary residence can encompass legitimate stays for purposes such as education, employment, or safety.

The Court rejected the opposition, ruling that a woman sincerely residing in Delhi when filing can seek jurisdiction there, irrespective of the locations of the domestic violence incidents.

In the case of Ram Krishna Singh v. Union of India, the Delhi High Court upheld the broad jurisdiction under Section 27 despite the husband’s objections. However, it is essential to recognize the potential for misuse of this wide jurisdiction. For example, some wives might intentionally relocate to a jurisdiction offering more favourable maintenance options, thereby increasing the litigation pressure on the other party. While the law appropriately emphasizes providing justice to wronged women, courts must also ensure that jurisdictional choices genuinely reflect residence rather than being strategic attempts to gain higher maintenance. Finding this balance continues to be a challenge in interpreting Section 27.

Similarly, a key ruling regarding the extent of jurisdiction under Section 27 is the Supreme Court’s decision in Dheeraj Arora v. Pariney Khanna,¹² Delhi High Court (May 8, 2025). This case specifically tackled the increasing confusion and disputes related to the interpretation of the word “resides” in Section 27.

In this case, the woman, who felt wronged, submitted a request for relief under the Domestic Violence Act in Delhi, even though the claims of domestic violence involved several places, such as Jammu, Chennai, Rajasthan, and Gujarat. The husband then petitioned to dismiss the proceedings, arguing that the case did not fall under Delhi’s jurisdiction according to Section 27, since the events had not taken place there and she did not genuinely live in Delhi.

The Delhi High Court confirmed that jurisdiction under Section 27 is appropriately established if the person affected truly lives (either permanently or temporarily) in the forum at the time of filing their case. The Court highlighted two important points:

The existence of multiple locations where the alleged abuse occurred does not limit jurisdiction, Delhi Magistrates can address the case if the woman is currently present and living there.
The occurrence of domestic violence in various places does not invalidate the application, the key consideration is the petitioner’s residence at the time the complaint is filed.

“Genuine temporary residence is enough to establish jurisdiction. The DV Act should not force an affected woman to return to the very situation she has escaped in order to seek justice.”

This decision is significant as it emphasizes that jurisdiction under Section 27 is focused on the victim and is meant to enhance access to justice, rather than hinder it. At the same time, it indicates that courts must verify that the residence is legitimate, addressing worries about strategic relocations for greater financial support or convenience.

This ruling is crucial as it establishes the principle that Section 27 should be interpreted broadly and in favour of the woman affected. It confronts the jurisdictional challenges often used to postpone cases and clarifies that:

Any authentic place of shelter is valid for jurisdiction, regardless of whether it is temporary.
Courts must prioritize the safety of women and their access to justice over procedural technicalities.
Strategic objections should not undermine or hinder the protective measures provided by the Domestic Violence Act.

By articulating these principles, Dheeraj Arora v. Pariney Khanna¹³ ,^xcreates a binding precedent that ensures the jurisdiction under Section 27 remains focused on the victim, strong against delays, while still permitting courts to assess the authenticity of the claimed residence.

This ruling emphasizes a key principle, that the venue should correspond with true presence rather than merely the location of the abuse. It upholds the objective of Section 27 to ensure that protection is available where the victim lives, even if only temporarily, and dismisses objections that are solely based on the locations related to the cause of action. Notwithstanding to the above judgement, several issues persisted in the courts regarding the residence conforming;

Verification of Genuine Residence

Despite the established precedent, Magistrates still need to determine whether the claimed residence is authentic or artificially created to establish jurisdiction. This investigation often results in preliminary litigation and the collection of evidence, which can delay urgent relief.

Increase in Forum Shopping Claims

The court’s lenient stance has encouraged some litigants to select more favourable venues, leading to more objections from the opposing parties. Courts are seeing a rise in allegations that the aggrieved party has strategically manipulated jurisdiction to secure higher maintenance or create difficulties for the other party.

Varying Interpretations by Lower Court

Not all Magistrates and High Courts have uniformly interpreted the precedents. Some take a lenient approach, while others demand strict proof of residency, resulting in inconsistent decisions and ongoing uncertainty for those involved.

Administrative and Logistical Challenges

As broader jurisdiction is acknowledged, cases are being initiated in locations far removed from the original matrimonial residence. Respondents argue this results in practical difficulties, including lengthy travel, challenges in presenting evidence, and higher litigation expenses.

The Bombay High Court’s broad interpretation- that proceedings under the DV Act are permissible in India even if the alleged violence occurred overseas, extended beyond just one case. This rationale was quickly referenced in other disputes involving NRIs and cross-border marriages, contributing to a wider interpretation of Section 27. When the issue was brought before the Supreme Court in Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra (2025), Justice Abhay S. Oka openly admitted that his previous, narrower interpretation as a Bombay High Court judge was incorrect, thus aligning himself with the broader perspective. This acknowledgment emphasized the need for a liberal interpretation of Section 27 in favour of victims.¹⁴ ^xi

Simultaneously, the Bombay High Court’s position raised concerns among some legal practitioners regarding the potential for forum shopping, leading courts to stress that the claimed residence must be genuine. Rather than diminishing its authority, this ongoing discussion has made the Bombay High Court’s reasoning a foundational element in the developing jurisprudence regarding Section 27, striking a balance between victim protection and procedural justice.

One of the latest official interpretations of Section 27 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) was provided by the Supreme Court of India in its order on May 19, 2025. In this decision, the Court reiterated the complete text of Section 27, which pertains to the territorial jurisdiction for proceedings under the DV Act.

In the case of Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chabra¹⁵, (2025 SCC Online SC 734), ^xiithe wife, after allegedly experiencing domestic violence in her marital home, relocated to another city to stay with her parents and filed a petition under the Domestic Violence Act (DV Act) there. The husband opposed this, arguing that the incidents transpired in a different location and that she changed jurisdictions merely to create difficulties for him and seek increased maintenance. He then sought to have the High Court dismiss the case due to lack of territorial jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court fully cited Section 27 and confirmed that jurisdiction is established not only where the violence happened but also at the location where the aggrieved woman either permanently or temporarily lives, runs a business, or works. A temporary residence is considered valid if it is genuine, particularly when a woman has moved for safety or support. The Court also noted that orders issued under the DV Act are enforceable nationwide, and advised High Courts to be cautious when using their powers to quash cases under Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS) to prevent technicalities from undermining the protective purpose of the Act.

Section 27 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 has been interpreted in a broad and victim-centred way, allowing women affected by violence to file their cases in courts based on where they live, work, or conduct business, whether temporarily or permanently. This expansive jurisdiction enables women to seek protection from a safe place without having to return to the site of abuse. However, courts have noted that some women may exploit this opportunity by changing jurisdictions solely to obtain more favourable maintenance or to cause difficulty for the respondent. To address this potential misuse, magistrates need to thoroughly examine the authenticity of the claimed residence and the intentions behind it. A balanced approach will ensure that Section 27 effectively safeguards women’s rights while also protecting the valid interests of the other party. (Case mine, n.d.)

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