The Three-Year Practice Requirement for Judicial Services in India: Ensuring Judicial Competence or Restricting Access

This article has been written by Rohit pursuing Ph.d from Department of Law Kurukshetra University Kurukshetra.

***This article has been selected for LegalOnus Law Journal (LLJ) Volume 1 Issue 8 2025

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Abstract The introduction of a mandatory three-year legal practice requirement for entry into the lower judiciary in India has sparked considerable legal and academic debate. Advocates of the rule argue that it enhances the quality and competence of the judiciary by ensuring that prospective judges possess practical courtroom experience and a nuanced understanding of legal procedures. Critics, however, contend that the rule arbitrarily limits access to judicial service, disproportionately affects fresh law graduates, and may undermine the principles of equal opportunity and merit-based selection. This research paper critically examines the constitutional validity, practical implications, and policy rationale of the three-year bar rule within the framework of Articles 233 and 234 of the Indian Constitution, which govern the appointment of district judges and other judicial officers. It analyses recent judicial pronouncements, particularly the Supreme Court’s affirmation of the rule in All India Judges’ Association v Union of India (2023), and assesses its alignment with the broader goals of judicial reform, access to justice, and judicial independence. The paper also explores the divergent practices followed by various states in implementing judicial service eligibility criteria, and the impact of this inconsistency on the federal legal structure and aspiring candidates. Through a comparative analysis with judicial appointment models in other jurisdictions, such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany, the study highlights potential alternatives that strike a better balance between theoretical knowledge and practical expertise. Ultimately, the research seeks to answer whether the 3-year practice rule genuinely advances judicial competence or if it functions as a barrier to entry, undermining inclusivity and diversity in the Indian judiciary. It concludes by offering policy recommendations for harmonizing merit, experience, and judicial integrity in recruitment to the lower judiciary. Keywords Judicial Services, Three-Year Bar Rule, Legal Practice Requirement, Judicial Appointments, Article 233, Article 234, Access to Judiciary, Legal Education, Merit vs Experience, Judicial Reform, Comparative Legal Systems, Indian Constitution, Entry-level Judges, Lower Judiciary, All India Judges’ Association Case

Research Methodology

This research adopts a doctrinal and analytical approach to examine the constitutional, legal, and policy implications of the three-year practice requirement for entry into the Indian judiciary. The methodology involves a thorough review of primary legal sources, including constitutional provisions, case law, and government notifications, as well as secondary sources such as legal commentaries, academic journals, policy reports, and expert opinions.

Doctrinal Research

The core of this study relies on doctrinal analysis, primarily focusing on:

• Constitutional provisions: Article 233 and 234 of the Indian Constitution concerning judicial appointments.
• Judicial precedents: Special emphasis is placed on the Supreme Court’s ruling in All India Judges’ Association v Union of India (2023) and other relevant judgments that discuss the qualifications and eligibility criteria for judicial posts.
• Statutory frameworks: Examination of state notifications and rules issued under the relevant High Court and Public Service Commission regulations.

2. Comparative Legal Analysis

To contextualize the Indian position, the research includes a comparative study of judicial recruitment models in countries like:

• United States: where prior legal practice is typically essential for judgeships.
• Germany: where judges are trained through structured academic and professional programs post-law school.
• United Kingdom: where judicial appointment requires a minimum number of years in legal practice or advocacy.

This comparative lens helps assess whether India’s 3-year bar rule aligns with global best practices or stands as an anomaly.

Policy Review

The research includes critical examination of policy recommendations from:

• Law Commission Reports
• National Judicial Pay Commission
• Parliamentary Committee Reports
• NITI Aayog publications

These reports are used to assess the empirical and theoretical basis behind the introduction of the practice requirement.

Critical Evaluation

A critical lens is applied to evaluate:

• Whether the rule meets the objectives of judicial competence and independence
• Its impact on diversity, inclusivity, and access
• Constitutional concerns under Articles 14, 21, and 233

No field surveys or empirical studies are conducted; the research remains qualitative and interpretative in nature.

Hypothesis

This research is founded on the hypothesis that:

“The mandatory three-year legal practice requirement for entry into the Indian lower judiciary, though intended to enhance judicial competence, may inadvertently restrict access for meritorious candidates and perpetuate structural inequality, thereby calling for a balanced re-evaluation in light of constitutional principles and comparative legal frameworks.”

Supporting Assumptions:

1. Judicial competence is not solely dependent on years of practice but also on academic merit, critical thinking, and judicial temperament.
2. Practical experience, while beneficial, should not become a barrier that excludes bright, young law graduates from underrepresented communities.
3. The current non-uniform application of the rule across states may lead to regional disparities and unequal treatment of candidates.
4. The requirement may not necessarily ensure better judicial performance unless supported by continuous training, mentoring, and evaluation mechanisms.
5. Constitutional provisions, such as Articles 14 (Equality before Law) and 233 (Appointment of District Judges), do not expressly mandate such a rule, allowing room for judicial or legislative reinterpretation.

Introduction

The integrity and competence of the judiciary are vital to the administration of justice in any democracy. In India, the recruitment of judges to the lower judiciary has historically allowed fresh law graduates to appear for judicial service examinations. However, this practice has come under significant scrutiny in recent years, especially with the introduction of the “three-year practice rule,” which mandates that candidates must have at least three years of legal practice before they are eligible to apply for the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) or equivalent entry-level positions.

This shift in recruitment policy has been legally and constitutionally contested, culminating in the Supreme Court’s judgment in All India Judges’ Association v Union of India (2023), where the Court upheld the legitimacy of the rule. The rationale offered was that practical exposure in the courts is essential for aspiring judges to gain a grounded understanding of procedural law, ethics, and real-life litigation challenges.[2] However, the decision sparked debates about whether such a rule violates Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law, by excluding academically meritorious but inexperienced candidates.

While supporters argue that the rule enhances judicial preparedness and maturity, critics contend that it disproportionately affects first-generation lawyers, women, and underprivileged candidates, potentially entrenching systemic inequality in the judicial selection process.[3] This concern is amplified by the lack of uniformity in the application of this rule across different states, raising questions about federal coherence and fairness.

Moreover, the constitutional framework under Articles 233 and 234, which governs judicial appointments to the district judiciary, leaves room for the respective state governments and High Courts to frame eligibility rules. This delegation of power, while flexible, has led to fragmented recruitment criteria, causing inconsistency and uncertainty among aspiring candidates.[4]

In this context, the three-year bar rule represents a critical legal development, not only in terms of judicial appointments but also in relation to constitutional rights, legal education, and access to justice. This paper seeks to critically examine the validity, implications, and efficacy of the rule, with a view to recommending reforms that balance judicial competence with inclusivity and equal opportunity.

1. Constitutional Framework Governing Judicial Appointments
2. Article 233 and Article 234: Scope and Interpretation

The appointment process to the Indian subordinate judiciary is rooted in Part VI, Chapter VI of the Constitution. Article 233 lays down the procedure for the appointment of district judges, specifying that such appointments shall be made by the Governor in consultation with the High Court. A significant qualification is embedded in this provision—it requires the candidate to have been an advocate or pleader for not less than seven years, thereby establishing experience as a statutory requirement for higher-level judges.[5]

However, Article 234, which governs appointments of persons other than district judges (such as Civil Judges or Judicial Magistrates), provides that such appointments shall be made by the Governor in consultation with the State Public Service Commission and the High Court. Importantly, this provision does not prescribe any minimum practice requirement or any other specific qualifications.[6] The absence of such a requirement for entry-level judges has historically enabled fresh law graduates to compete for these posts directly after completing their degrees.

Delegated Discretion and Regulatory Variation Among States

In practice, the recruitment process for the lower judiciary is regulated by state-specific judicial service rules framed under Article 234. This decentralised scheme has led to inconsistent eligibility requirements across states. For instance, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh introduced a mandatory three-year bar practice rule in their respective judicial service rules, while others like Delhi continue to allow direct recruitment from among law graduates.[7]

This diversity has sparked a constitutional debate: can state rules impose qualifications not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution? The crux lies in determining whether a practice requirement furthers the objectives of justice or violates Article 14, which guarantees equality before the law. Critics argue that the rule discriminates against fresh law graduates, especially those from marginalised backgrounds who cannot afford to engage in litigation without financial support.

Principle of Reasonableness and Equal Opportunity

In Indra Sawhney v Union of India, the Supreme Court held that any classification must be founded on intelligible differentia and must bear a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved.[8] Applying this principle, it remains contested whether a mandatory three-year practice rule can withstand constitutional scrutiny under the test of reasonableness, particularly when no empirical evidence has been produced to conclusively prove that such experience translates into better judicial performance.

• Judicial Interpretation: The Supreme Court’s Endorsement of the Rule
• The All-India Judges’ Association Case (2023)

The constitutionality of the three-year practice requirement came under direct judicial scrutiny in All India Judges’ Association v Union of India (2023). The petitioners challenged various state amendments introducing the bar practice rule, arguing that such a requirement is arbitrary, lacks constitutional backing, and infringes on Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion, upheld the validity of the rule, observing that courtroom experience cultivates essential judicial skills such as understanding of procedural nuances, management of court records, legal reasoning in a live setting, and appreciation of judicial decorum.[9] The Court emphasized that judges, unlike academic scholars, require a “working knowledge of litigation” to effectively discharge their functions.

It reasoned that while Articles 233 and 234 are silent on minimum practice for lower judiciary appointments, the power of states to set reasonable eligibility conditions under service rules is well-recognized. The Court also held that the rule did not violate Article 14 since it applied uniformly within each state jurisdiction and was justified by the legitimate aim of improving judicial quality.

Dissent and Critical Observations

Despite upholding the rule, the decision has drawn criticism from scholars and former judges. Many argue that the Court’s approach places undue emphasis on formalistic experience rather than actual competence or legal acumen. Critics have also pointed out that no empirical evidence was furnished to demonstrate a correlation between three years of practice and judicial efficiency or integrity.[10]

Further, the Court failed to address the disproportionate impact of the rule on certain groups—especially women and students from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds who might not have the means to engage in unpaid litigation practice. Scholars like Faizan Mustafa have warned that the rule risks creating a “socially exclusive judiciary”, undermining the diversity necessary for a representative bench.[11]

Additionally, the judgment leaves open the possibility of non-uniform eligibility rules across states, potentially affecting candidates preparing for multiple judicial exams simultaneously. The absence of a central standard could exacerbate inequality and confusion in an already complex recruitment system.

• Impact on Diversity and Access to Judiciary
• Structural Barriers for First-Generation and Marginalised Candidates

One of the most pressing criticisms of the three-year bar practice requirement is that it creates systemic barriers for aspirants from underrepresented communities. For many first-generation law graduates, especially those from rural areas, Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs), and Other Backward Classes (OBCs), pursuing litigation without financial security is extremely challenging.[12] The absence of a stable income during the early years of practice in district courts makes it difficult for these candidates to remain in the profession long enough to qualify under the rule.

Unlike salaried professions or in-house legal roles, the initial litigation phase is financially insecure, with most junior advocates either unpaid or underpaid. This disproportionately affects aspirants without familial legal backgrounds or urban resources. Critics argue that the rule, while facially neutral, has a disparate impact that indirectly violates Article 14’s guarantee of equality and Article 16’s promise of equal opportunity in public employment.[13]

Gendered Consequences

The gendered impact of the rule is also significant. Female law graduates often face societal pressures to seek secure, early employment, and litigation—being uncertain and male-dominated—poses added challenges.[14] By extending the eligibility timeline, the rule potentially dissuades women from even attempting to enter the judiciary. This compounds the already existing gender gap in the Indian judicial system, where women constitute less than 30% of the lower judiciary and even lower percentages in higher courts.[15]

• Risk to Judicial Inclusivity and Representation

The judiciary, as an organ of state, must reflect the diverse voices and lived experiences of the society it serves. Limiting access through a professional experience requirement, without safeguards or alternatives, could lead to a bench that is less inclusive and less empathetic, particularly to litigants from disadvantaged backgrounds.

In jurisdictions like South Africa and Canada, judicial diversity is actively pursued through tailored eligibility norms and affirmative appointments.[16] India, on the other hand, risks reinforcing elite dominance if the current policy trajectory remains unchallenged.

• Comparative Models of Judicial Entry: A Global Perspective
• United Kingdom: Focus on Merit and Competence

In the United Kingdom, entry into the judiciary is governed by the Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC), which evaluates candidates based on merit, experience, and aptitude, rather than rigid practice years. For most entry-level judicial posts such as District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts), a minimum of five to seven years’ post-qualification legal experience is required, which may include academic, corporate, or advisory roles—not just litigation.[17] This broader definition of “legal experience” allows for a more inclusive and skills-based assessment of judicial candidates.

• United States: Diversity of Routes and Appointments

The U.S. does not follow a uniform national procedure for judicial appointments. Most judges, especially at the state level, are either elected or appointed through a combination of political processes and professional vetting. Importantly, there is no statutory requirement that limits eligibility based on fixed years of legal practice.[18] Law professors, public defenders, and legal scholars often ascend to the bench based on their reputation, contributions to legal thought, and public service. This model allows diverse professional backgrounds to be represented in the judiciary.

• France and Germany: Early Judicial Career Tracks

France and Germany provide an instructive contrast. Both jurisdictions employ a career judiciary model, where law graduates are recruited directly into the judicial service through rigorous national-level exams followed by intensive state-funded training.[19] In Germany, for example, judicial aspirants enter a structured system of Referendariat (legal clerkship), followed by state examinations and specialized judicial training.[20] This system is meritocratic, inclusive, and transparent, relying on academic performance and judicial temperament rather than on years of advocacy practice.

These models reflect the possibility of balancing professional competence with accessibility and social inclusion—without compromising judicial quality.

Implications for India

India’s three-year bar rule, by contrast, resembles a hybrid system but leans heavily toward a practice-driven gatekeeping model, without offering alternative training mechanisms or financial support. This contrasts sharply with jurisdictions that prioritize judicial education, structured probation, and evaluative recruitment. Introducing judicial academies, stipends, or a national judicial training framework could mitigate the negative effects of the current rule.

• Evaluating the Rule: Need for Reform and Balanced Alternatives
• Rationale Behind the Rule: Valid Objectives

The three-year bar practice requirement, as defended by its proponents, stems from a desire to enhance the functional readiness of judicial officers. Judicial work demands not only academic knowledge but also practical understanding of courtroom procedure, case management, and real-world dispute resolution.[21] Advocates of the rule argue that fresh graduates, though intellectually capable, often lack the hands-on experience and maturity necessary for sound judicial decision-making.

By mandating a short but meaningful period of practice, the rule is expected to build a cadre of judges who are better equipped to appreciate litigants’ needs, manage courtroom dynamics, and avoid procedural lapses.

Structural Shortcomings and Unintended Consequences

However, as highlighted earlier, the rule fails to accommodate the socio-economic realities of the legal profession. The absence of structured mentorship, financial assistance, or formalised apprenticeship during the practice years disproportionately burdens aspirants from lower socio-economic backgrounds.[22] The judiciary, in turn, risks losing potentially outstanding candidates who abandon the profession due to financial or familial pressures during the “waiting period.”

Moreover, the rule is being applied inconsistently across states, creating confusion and inequality. While some High Courts follow it strictly, others permit fresh graduates to appear directly. This lack of national standardisation weakens the credibility of the recruitment process and creates an unfair advantage for aspirants in states with more relaxed norms.[23]

Recommendations for Reform

A balanced way forward must involve preserving the spirit of the rule—ensuring that judges have practical competence—while removing its exclusionary effects. Potential reforms include:

• Judicial Apprenticeship Programs: States can introduce paid internships or training periods under the supervision of senior judges, offering experience without financial burden.
• Stipend for Junior Litigators: Institutional support in the form of minimum stipends for junior lawyers could reduce attrition from the profession during the three-year window.
• National Judicial Services Examination (NJSE): A centralised system with uniform eligibility norms and state-funded training could ensure meritocracy and inclusiveness.
• Diversified Experience Criteria: Instead of strictly requiring litigation, states could accept equivalent legal experience in academia, corporate, or public legal services—mirroring international models.

Such reforms would strike a balance between judicial readiness and equitable access, promoting a diverse, capable, and representative bench.

Conclusion

The introduction and judicial endorsement of the three-year bar practice rule mark a significant turning point in India’s approach to lower judiciary recruitment. While the rationale behind the rule—ensuring that judicial officers have practical courtroom exposure—is understandable, the implementation of a rigid practice requirement without supporting infrastructure has raised complex constitutional, social, and policy challenges.

The rule disproportionately affects aspirants from economically weaker sections, women, and first-generation lawyers by delaying entry into public service without offering financial or institutional support. Furthermore, the absence of a nationally standardised framework has created inconsistencies between states, undermining the principle of equal opportunity in judicial service.

Comparative global models—from Europe’s career judiciary systems to the skill-based appointments in the UK and US—demonstrate that it is possible to design judicial recruitment pathways that balance experience with inclusivity. India must take inspiration from these systems while crafting a context-specific, equitable solution.

To preserve judicial quality without excluding deserving candidates, reforms such as state-funded judicial apprenticeships, stipends for junior litigators, and broader definitions of legal experience must be considered. The proposed National Judicial Services Examination (NJSE) also offers an opportunity to infuse uniformity, transparency, and merit into the process.

Ultimately, judicial diversity is not merely a token aspiration—it is central to the legitimacy and empathy of the bench. The goal must be to foster a judiciary that is not only legally competent but also socially representative and constitutionally aligned. Only then can justice truly be accessible, impartial, and reflective of the democratic ethos of the Indian Constitution.

[1] Authored by Rohit pursuing Ph.d from Department of Law Kurukshetra University Kurukshetra

[2] All India Judges’ Association v Union of India (2023) 6 SCC 211

[3] Faizan Mustafa, ‘Does Three-Year Experience Rule Block Social Diversity in Judiciary?’ The Leaflet (15 March 2023)

[4] Constitution of India, arts 233–234.

[5] Constitution of India 1950, art 233

[6] Constitution of India 1950, art 234.

[7] See eg, Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service Rules 2001 (as amended), r 5; Madhya Pradesh Civil Judge Class II Recruitment Rules 2019, r 4.

[8] Indra Sawhney v Union of India AIR 1993 SC 477.

[9] All India Judges’ Association v Union of India (2023) 6 SCC 211 [para 32].

[10] Abhinav Chandrachud, ‘Judging the Judges: Experience and Judicial Entry Barriers’ (2023) 9(2) Indian Law Review 178

[11] Faizan Mustafa, ‘The Three-Year Bar Rule: A Step Backwards for Diversity in the Judiciary’ The Leaflet (15 March 2023)

[12] Nikhil Dey and Aruna Roy, ‘Why the Poor Cannot Wait Three Years: The Judiciary’s Closed Gates’ The Hindu (27 March 2023)

[13] Constitution of India 1950, arts 14 and 16.

[14] Jhuma Sen, ‘Gender, Practice, and the Courts: How the Bar Rule May Affect Women Aspirants’ (2023) 7(1) Socio-Legal Review Forum.

[15] India Justice Report, Judicial Diversity in India (2022)

[16] Kate Malleson, ‘Rethinking the Merit Principle in Judicial Selection’ (2006) 33(1) Journal of Law and Society 126.

[17] Judicial Appointments Commission (UK), ‘Eligibility Requirements’ (JAC, 2024)

[18] Lawrence Baum, American Courts: Process and Policy (8th edn, Cengage Learning 2012) 88–91.

[19] John Bell, Judiciaries Within Europe: A Comparative Review (CUP 2006) 145.

[20] Anne Sanders, ‘The German Judge: Professional Training and Career Path’ (2017) 5(2) German Law Journal 155.

[21] All India Judges’ Association v Union of India (2023) 6 SCC 211 [para 39].

[22] Tarunabh Khaitan, ‘Equality, Indirect Discrimination and the Judiciary’ (2022) 12(1) Indian Journal of Constitutional Law 37.

[23] Abhinav Kumar, ‘Uneven Paths: Judicial Eligibility Rules Across Indian States’ Bar and Bench (7 October 2023)