Role of Successor Judges in Criminal Proceedings: A Case Study of Harshad Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh

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This article has been written by Sathya Sruthi, currently in her 4th year pursuing BBA LLB in Symbiosis Law School Hyderabad.

Harshad Gupta

State of Chhattisgarh,

Crl.A. No. 4080 of 2024

Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 800

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION:

In criminal law, once a conviction judgment is delivered, the case typically moves solely to sentencing, with the conviction standing final unless appealed. Under Section 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), the process is divided into two parts: sub-section (1), which involves delivering the judgment of conviction or acquittal, and sub-section (2), which mandates a separate hearing on sentencing if a conviction is rendered. Section 353 requires that judgments be delivered in open court, while Section 354 outlines specific requirements for judgment composition. In today’s scenario, where there is heightened awareness around proportionality and the need for individualized sentencing, Section 235 allows courts to consider factors such as the accused’s background, the gravity of the offense, and mitigating circumstances before imposing a sentence. This ensures that justice is not only served but is seen to be humane and context-sensitive. Moreover, it reflects the system’s commitment to rehabilitative justice, offering a structured opportunity for the accused to present arguments on sentence length and type, which aligns with contemporary calls for sentencing reforms and alternative forms of punishment. In the case at hand, the appellant challenged the High Court of Chhattisgarh’s judgment denying his request for a fresh hearing on both conviction and sentencing following the transfer of the original judge who had convicted him. The appellant argued that the new Presiding Officer should rehear the entire case, citing Sections 353 and 354 of the Cr.P.C.

FACTS:

The appellant was charged under Sections 376 (rape)[1] and 506 (criminal intimidation)[2] of the Indian Penal Code following FIR No. 03/13, filed on 28.05.2013. The trial was conducted, and on 30.04.2015, the appellant was convicted by Presiding Officer Mr. J.R. Banjara. It is pertinent to know that here presiding officer refers to the judge of trial. Before sentencing could take place, the appellant sought exemption from appearing in court due to an accident. During this period, Mr. Banjara was transferred, and Mr. Mohammad Rizwan Khan replaced him as the new Presiding Officer. The appellant argued that, with the change in Presiding Officer, a fresh hearing on both conviction and sentencing was necessary, citing Sections 353[3] and 354[4] of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), which address the delivery and content of judgments. However, the court clarified that Section 235[5] of the Cr.P.C. divides the process into two distinct stages: (1) pronouncement of conviction or acquittal, and (2) a separate hearing on sentencing. Since the conviction had already been finalized under Section 235(1), only sentencing under Section 235(2) remained.

ISSUES:

The issues raised in the Harshad Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh, are

Whether a Successor Presiding Officer Must Rehear the Conviction

The primary issue was whether the new Presiding Officer, after the original judge’s transfer, was required to reopen the judgment on conviction and rehear arguments on the appellant’s guilt. The appellant argued that since the original judge had been transferred post-conviction but before sentencing, the new judge should review the case from the start.

Interpretation of Section 235 of the Cr.P.C. Regarding Separate Stages for Conviction and Sentencing

A critical issue was the interpretation of Section 235 of the Cr.P.C., which mandates two stages: (1) the judgment on conviction or acquittal, and (2) a separate hearing on sentencing if there is a conviction. The court examined whether the pronouncement of conviction under Section 235(1) stands final once declared, thereby limiting the role of a successor judge to sentencing under Section 235(2).

Compliance with Sections 353 and 354 of the Cr.P.C. in the Pronouncement of Conviction

Another issue was whether the original conviction judgment, pronounced by the first Presiding Officer, met the procedural standards under Section 353 ,which requires that judgments be pronounced in open court) and Section 354 ,which requires judgments to clearly outline the grounds for conviction or acquittal.

Procedural Rights of the Appellant on Sentencing under Section 235(2)

Lastly, the issue regarding the appellant’s rights during the sentencing phase under Section 235(2). Given that the sentencing stage provides a chance for the accused to present mitigating factors, the court evaluated whether the appellant’s rights would be preserved if sentencing were conducted by a new Presiding Officer without reopening the conviction judgment.

The issues centred on whether a successor judge must rehear the conviction upon the original judge’s transfer, the interpretation of Section 235’s bifurcated process for conviction and sentencing, compliance with Sections 353 and 354 during the initial conviction, and the procedural fairness of proceeding directly to sentencing with a new judge. The court’s decision emphasized that once a conviction is declared under Section 235(1), it is final, and only sentencing under Section 235(2) remains within the purview of a successor judge.

ARGUMENTS OF APPELLANT

Requirement of Rehearing on Conviction by the New Presiding Officer

The appellant argued that with the transfer of the original Presiding Officer, Mr. J.R. Banjara, who had convicted him but had not yet pronounced the sentence, the new Presiding Officer, Mr. Mohammad Rizwan Khan, should rehear the case on the question of conviction itself. The appellant relied on Sections 353 and 354 of the Cr.P.C. to argue that a valid judgment requires both proper pronouncement and complete reasoning, which he contended necessitated a fresh hearing by the new judge. He claimed that since the judge who convicted him was no longer in office, a different judge should not proceed directly to sentencing without first reconsidering the conviction.

Interpretation of Section 235 of the Cr.P.C. as Permitting Re-examination of Conviction

The appellant contended that Section 235 of the Cr.P.C. permits a bifurcation in the process, but argued that it does not limit the authority of a new Presiding Officer to revisit the conviction. He interpreted Section 235(1) as flexible, allowing for rehearing on conviction if the original judge is no longer present.The appellant thus argued that since conviction and sentencing are two separate stages, the entry of a new judge before the sentencing stage implied a duty to re-evaluate the conviction as well, effectively challenging the finality of the original conviction under Section 235(1).

Procedural Violations under Sections 353 and 354 of the Cr.P.C.

The appellant claimed procedural irregularities in the original conviction judgment, contending that it failed to meet the Section 353 requirement of open pronouncement and Section 354 requirement of a well-reasoned judgment. He claimed that Section 353 mandates that a judgment must be delivered in open court by the same judge who has heard the evidence, ensuring transparency and comprehension for the accused.He argued that a judgment pronounced by a new judge would ensure compliance with these sections, especially considering that the original judge could not oversee the sentencing phase. An additional claim in the appellant’s argument also implied that the original conviction might not fully satisfy Section 354(1), as the new judge could better understand and deliberate on the complete facts and circumstances.

Appellant’s Rights under Section 235(2) Would Be Adequately Protected

The appellant expressed concern that his right to a fair hearing on sentencing under Section 235(2) would be compromised if the new judge did not review the conviction as well. He argued that by not revisiting the conviction, the new judge might lack full insight into the case, potentially leading to an unfair sentence. The appellant contended that rehearing the conviction could allow the judge to better evaluate mitigating factors, ensuring a just and balanced sentencing.

ARGUMENTS BY RESPONDENT:

Section 235(1) is considered final, regardless of a change in presiding judge.

The respondent countered that once a judgment of conviction is pronounced under Section 235(1), it is considered final, regardless of a change in presiding judge. They argued that allowing each new judge to rehear previous convictions would lead to inefficiency and disrupt judicial finality. The respondent emphasized that procedural finality is essential in criminal trials to avoid unnecessary delays. Procedural finality was also emphasized from the respondent counsel. The respondent cited prior case law establishing that judicial succession does not mandate reopening concluded stages, such as a conviction under Section 235(1).

Conviction determined under Section 235(1) considered functus officio in relation to the conviction stage

The respondent contended that Section 235 clearly distinguishes conviction from sentencing. Once conviction is determined under Section 235(1), the trial court is considered functus officio in relation to the conviction stage. They asserted that Section 235 does not provide for revisiting the conviction itself and is instead designed to ensure the accused is given a fair opportunity to be heard on sentencing alone under Section 235(2). The respondent argued that the appellant’s interpretation would undermine judicial efficiency by reopening completed stages and was contrary to the Cr.P.C.’s structure.

Sections 353 and 354 under Cr.P.C is fully satisfied under the instant case

The respondent countered that Sections 353 and 354 had been fully satisfied, as the initial conviction was pronounced by the previous judge in open court, and the appellant’s counsel was present. They argued that Section 353 was not meant to allow reopening of the conviction stage in cases of judicial transfer, and Section 354 does not require the same judge to remain for sentencing after the judgment’s pronouncement. The respondent pointed out that the judgment met all requirements, including reasoning and pronouncement in open court, and that these provisions were unrelated to the procedural actions following a judicial transfer.

Appellant’s rights under Section 235(2) of Cr.P.C were safeguarded

The respondent asserted that the appellant’s rights under Section 235(2) were safeguarded, as this section provides the appellant an opportunity to be heard on sentencing specifically, without the need to revisit the conviction. They argued that since conviction and sentencing are distinct stages, a fresh examination of the conviction would exceed Section 235(2)’s scope and was neither required nor intended by the Cr.P.C. The respondent assured that the appellant would be granted a fair hearing on the quantum of the sentence, allowing him to present mitigating evidence or other considerations before the new judge without altering the established conviction.

COURTS REASONING:

The court held that once a conviction is pronounced under Section 235(1) of the Cr.P.C., it is final, and the trial court is considered functus officio regarding the conviction. This finality means that the conviction judgment does not need to be re-examined or re-pronounced due to a change in the presiding judge.

Preventing Delays and Judicial Inefficiency: Allowing a new judge to rehear the entire case after a judicial transfer would create procedural inefficiencies and undermine the principle of finality. The court reasoned that the criminal justice system relies on this finality to prevent repeated litigation and unnecessary delays, which would compromise the interests of justice.

Therefore, the court rejected the appellant’s argument for a rehearing on conviction by the new judge, holding that a transfer does not necessitate reopening a judgment already concluded by the predecessor.The court affirmed that Section 235 bifurcates the judgment process into two stages—conviction and sentencing—each with its distinct function. Section 235(1) pertains to the pronouncement of conviction, while Section 235(2) allows the convicted individual an opportunity to be heard on sentencing.

Role of Successor Judge: The court clarified that once the conviction is pronounced under Section 235(1), the only remaining responsibility of the trial court is to conduct the sentencing hearing under Section 235(2). Therefore, the new judge’s role was limited to hearing the appellant on the question of sentence, not the conviction itself, which had already been finalized.The court thus found that the appellant’s interpretation of Section 235 was unfounded and would blur the line between conviction and sentencing stages, leading to procedural complications without any legal basis.

The court observed that the conviction judgment by Mr. Banjara had been properly pronounced in open court and in the presence of the appellant’s counsel, which satisfied Section 353 of the Cr.P.C. The requirements for a transparent and public pronouncement of judgment were therefore met.

Self-Explanatory and Reasoned Judgment: Regarding Section 354, the court noted that the judgment of conviction was self-explanatory, adequately reasoned, and written by the original judge who had heard all evidence. This satisfied the mandate for a clear and comprehensive judgment under Section 354(1).

Continuity After Judicial Transfer: The court found that neither Section 353 nor Section 354 intended for a successor judge to re-pronounce or reevaluate a completed conviction judgment due to a judicial transfer. These sections merely regulate the procedural aspects of delivering a judgment in open court, and the appellant’s argument for rehearing was deemed irrelevant to these provisions.The court acknowledged that Section 235(2) provides the appellant a right to be heard specifically on sentencing, ensuring that mitigating factors can be considered before determining the final sentence.

Fairness and Scope of Section 235(2): The court emphasized that Section 235(2) did not extend to revisiting the conviction itself; it only granted the appellant the opportunity to make submissions regarding the sentence. The new judge would thus ensure that the appellant received a fair hearing on this aspect, maintaining procedural integrity without altering the settled conviction.

Procedural Justice Ensured: By upholding the separation between conviction and sentencing stages, the court maintained that procedural justice would be adequately served, allowing the appellant to argue mitigating circumstances without reopening the settled conviction.

PRECEDENT ANALYSIS:

In the case at hand, the court emphasized that Section 235 of the Cr.P.C. establishes a two-stage process: first, determining guilt, and then, if the accused is convicted, conducting a separate sentencing hearing. This bifurcated approach ensures procedural justice by providing the convicted individual an opportunity to present mitigating circumstances before sentencing. This principle was critical in the court’s reasoning to deny the appellant’s request for a rehearing of the conviction by the new presiding judge, as Section 235 does not support re-examining finalized convictions solely due to a judicial transfer. Instead, the court upheld that the sentencing stage could proceed independently under a new judge.
The BNSS incorporates similar protections but enhances procedural safeguards around judgment delivery, as seen in Section 258 of the BNSS[6]. It mandates that a judge issue a judgment within thirty days post-arguments, extendable to forty-five days with recorded reasons. For sentencing, if the accused is convicted, the judge is required to hear the accused on sentencing matters, mirroring Section 235’s intent to separate the judgment on guilt from sentencing. This aligns with the Cr.P.C. while adding structured timelines, thereby enhancing accountability and reducing potential delays in finalizing judgments.
The court in this case also addressed Sections 353 and 354 of the Cr.P.C., which govern the public pronouncement and content of judgments. In line with precedent, the court found that the original judge’s judgment had been validly pronounced in open court and met all legal requirements for clarity and reasoning.
The BNSS addresses these aspects with Sections 392[7] and 393[8], which add specificity to the judgment delivery process:
Section 392 mandates that a judgment be pronounced in open court within forty-five days of trial conclusion, ensuring both parties are notified and present. The section provides flexibility in judgment delivery, allowing for full reading, summary reading, or simply the operative part, with clear communication in a language the accused understands. This new provision builds on Section 353 of the Cr.P.C. by adding a 45-day timeframe, promoting transparency.
Section 393 of BNSS echoes Section 354 of the Cr.P.C. by outlining detailed requirements for judgment content. It specifies that a judgment must include points for determination, reasons for decisions, the offense description, and the section under which the conviction and sentence are made. It further requires that judgments, especially those involving severe penalties like the death sentence, contain special reasons, increasing the emphasis on judicial reasoning.

Enhancements Under BNSS for Procedural Finality and Judicial Accountability

The BNSS provisions reflect a shift towards standardized timelines and procedural clarity in delivering judgments, addressing delays and reinforcing the procedural integrity emphasized in Section 235 of the Cr.P.C.:

Judgment Timelines: By setting specific deadlines for judgment pronouncements (within 30–45 days), Sections 258 and 392 of the BNSS enhance the timely delivery of justice, reducing the uncertainties that may arise from judicial delays.
Detailed and Accessible Judgments: Section 393’s requirement for detailed judgments in the language of the court, including reasons for the verdict and alternative rulings if needed, ensures that judgments are transparent and accessible. This aligns with contemporary judicial needs, emphasizing both clarity and thoroughness.
These BNSS modifications aim to uphold justice by reinforcing procedural timelines, adding accountability, and safeguarding the convicted person’s right to a fair hearing, particularly at the sentencing stage.

JUDGEMENT:

Following the reasoning and arguments put forth by both sides , the court concluded that the appellant’s conviction had been validly pronounced and was final. The only issue that remained for decision was the quantum of the sentence, which would be dealt with under Section 235(2) of the Cr.P.C.

The court reiterated that Section 235 provides for a two-step process:

First, the conviction is decided under Section 235(1).
Then, if convicted, the accused is heard on sentencing under Section 235(2).

The trial court’s role in delivering a judgment of conviction was complete once the appellant’s guilt had been established, and the matter now only required a hearing on sentencing.

The Presiding Officer’s Role in Sentencing: The court ruled that it was appropriate for the new Presiding Officer to hear the appellant on the sentencing issue, as Section 235(2) requires a separate hearing specifically on sentencing. The procedural safeguard of hearing the accused on sentencing ensures fairness, particularly when a new judge takes over after conviction. The court emphasized that the appellant’s request to rehear the case on conviction was not justified, and the focus should now be solely on the sentence. Therefore, the High Court’s decision to uphold the conviction was affirmed, and the matter proceeded to the sentencing phase.

The final order follows where the court dismissed the appellant’s appeal, holding that:

There was no merit in the appellant’s contention that the new judge should have reheard the conviction.
The original conviction under Section 235(1) of the Cr.P.C. was final.
The only issue that remained was sentencing, which the new Presiding Officer was bound to address under Section 235(2) of the Cr.P.C.

Additionally, the court directed the trial court to proceed with the sentencing hearing within one month from the date of the order. The appellant was instructed to surrender before the trial court on 04.11.2024 and in the event of his absence or evasion, the police authorities were instructed to ensure his presence.

CONCLUSION:

Summarizing the entire cast from the facts to judgement pronounced in the Harshad Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh (Crl.A. No. 4080 of 2024), the Supreme Court upheld the finality of the conviction once pronounced under Section 235(1) of the Cr.P.C., clarifying that the transfer of the trial judge did not necessitate a rehearing of the conviction. The court emphasized that the role of the new judge was limited to hearing the accused on the quantum of sentence under Section 235(2), as conviction and sentencing are separate stages in criminal proceedings. The appeal was dismissed, and the matter was directed to proceed solely on the issue of sentencing, reinforcing the procedural integrity outlined in the Cr.P.C.

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