
This article has been written by Riddhima Jain, a first-year BBA LL.B. (Hons.) student at Christ University.

Abstract
This paper explores the nature of India’s constitutional framework, examining whether it aligns with traditional federal principles or incorporates unique characteristics. While certain features suggest a federal structure, others indicate a stronger central authority, leading to scholarly debate over its classification.
The discussion references contrasting perspectives on the subject, highlighting arguments that emphasise both federal and unitary elements. Key constitutional provisions and judicial interpretations are considered to examine their impact on the balance of power between different levels of government in India.
Additionally, the paper touches on evolving practices that influence governance, suggesting a flexible approach to federalism in response to practical needs. The analysis ultimately points to a nuanced system that resists rigid categorisation, adapting to the country’s specific requirements.
Keywords: Indian Constitution, federalism, quasi-federal, Unitary Bias, Ambedkar.
Introduction
When we begin learning about the Indian Constitution, one of the most common questions we come across is: Is India a federal country or not? At first, the answer seems simple: we have both the central and state governments, so it must be federal. But as we study further, we see that this question is more complex than it appears.
The debate on whether the Constitution of India is federal has persisted since its inception. While some scholars, like Prof. K.C. Wheare, have argued that the Indian Constitution is “quasi-federal,” others like Dr. B.R. Ambedkar have defended its federal nature, though acknowledging its unique characteristics. To understand whether India is a federal state, a unitary state or something in between, We need to understand the meaning of federalism, draw analogies, interpret the laws, look into real-life examples and then come to a conclusion.
What is Federalism?
Federalism is a system where power is constitutionally divided between a central government and regional entities, allowing each to govern independently within their areas while working together on shared issues. The U.S. Constitution is often considered the archetype of this model. The two levels of government derive their authority from a written constitution, and neither level is subordinate to the other in its assigned domain.
From the general definition, the following are seen as essential features of a federal system:
- Dual Government Polity: This refers to the presence of two levels of government, usually a central/national government and state/provincial governments, each operating independently in their sphere of authority.
- Division of Powers: The Constitution divides powers between the central and state governments. Each level has its jurisdiction over different matters.
- Rigidity of the Constitution: A federal constitution is usually rigid, meaning amendments require a special procedure that involves both the central and state governments. This ensures that neither level can unilaterally change the power structure.
- Independent Judiciary: An impartial and independent judiciary is essential to resolve disputes between different levels of government and to uphold the supremacy of the Constitution. It acts as the guardian of the Constitution.
- Bicameralism: A bicameral legislature, especially at the central level, ensures representation of states in the second chamber (like the Rajya Sabha in India or the Senate in the US), thus protecting their interests in national law-making.
A Constitution is considered “federal” if it includes all these elements in balance. However, many contemporary scholars agree that federalism is not simply binary; it exists on a spectrum. This perspective permits a more nuanced analysis of India’s model.
Prof. K.C. Wheare’s View
According to Prof. Wheare, “By the federal principle is meant the method of dividing powers, so that the general and regional governments are each within a sphere co-ordinate and independent.” This means that both the central and state governments function in their own separate areas without interfering in each other’s work. They are equal in status and not subordinate to one another.
A classic example of such a federal setup is the United States Constitution. It creates a system of “dual polity,” where both the federal and the state governments exist side by side. Their powers are clearly divided, and both are independent within their respective fields. As Prof. Wheare further observes, “The existence of co-ordinate authorities independent of each other is the gist of the federal principle.” This highlights that true federalism requires both levels of government to be equally strong and free in their own domains.
KC Wheare described the Constitution of India as “quasi-federal”. He remarked that “Indian Union is a unitary state with subsidiary federal features”. Wheare observed that during emergencies, the Indian Constitution allows the Centre to assume near-complete control, which, in his view, contradicts the idea of co-ordinate and independent functioning. Moreover, the power of Parliament to reorganise states under Article 3 of the Indian Constitution also disturbed the federal balance.
In summary, Wheare acknowledged some federal features but viewed the Indian model as unitary in its essence. His theory reflects the classical understanding of federalism, which may not fully accommodate the Indian context.
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s View
Dr. Ambedkar, as the chief architect of the Indian Constitution, offered a more pragmatic and contextual understanding. He acknowledged the central bias but insisted that India was indeed federal. During the Constituent Assembly Debates, he stated: “The Indian Constitution is a federal Constitution in as much as it established what may be called a dual polity which will consist of the Union at the Centre and the States at the periphery each endowed with sovereign powers to be exercised in the field assigned to them respectively by the Constitution.”
Ambedkar argued that the unique federal structure was designed keeping in mind India’s diversity, colonial past, and the need for unity. For him, the centralisation of power was not a flaw, but a necessary safeguard against internal disorder and secessionism. He also emphasised the presence of key federal features: distribution of legislative, administrative, and financial powers; the existence of independent states; and the judiciary’s role as the final interpreter.
Article 1(1) of the Indian Constitution states that “India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States.” As Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar deliberately ensured the use of the term “Union” instead of “Federation” because (a) Federalism in India had not been the result of an agreement among the units, and (b) The constituent units of the Indian Federation had no right to secede from it. The Drafting Committee observed that there were specific advantages in referring to India as a “Union,” even though “the Constitution was federal in structure.” He emphasised further that such an arrangement made the federation a permanent and unbreakable union.
Federal Features of the Indian Constitution:-
Let’s now examine how the Indian Constitution incorporates federal elements:
- Dual Polity- India has a dual polity, the Union and the States. Each has its own government functioning independently in certain areas. The Union List, State List, and Concurrent List (Seventh Schedule) reflect the division of legislative powers.
- Written Constitution– The Indian Constitution is the longest written constitution in the world and clearly defines the powers of the Centre and the States.
- Supremacy of the Constitution- Both levels of government operate under the authority of the Constitution. Any law that goes against it can be struck down by the judiciary.
- Independent Judiciary- The Supreme Court of India has the power of judicial review and acts as a guardian of the Constitution. It resolves disputes between the Centre and States.
- Rigid Constitution- Although not as rigid as the U.S. Constitution, certain amendments require ratification by at least half of the states, ensuring their participation in constitutional changes.
These features align with classical federalism. However, India’s federal structure differs significantly from that of the USA, where states came together to form a federation. When drafting India’s Constitution, the primary focus was on ensuring the “unity and integrity of India.” As a result, the Constitution includes several provisions that give it a unitary character, favouring the Union over the states.
Some of key unitary features are mentioned below:
- Residuary powers are with the Union Government
- Concept of single citizenship
- States can be created or diminished without their consent
- All India Services officers head important positions in States
- Emergency Provisions, especially Article 356
The Indian Constitution thus created a strong central government with state autonomy.
The Socio-Political Context of India’s Federalism
Unlike countries like the U.S. or Switzerland, where federalism was formed by the voluntary association of states, India’s federation is not a result of agreement among independent states. Instead, it was crafted to unify a highly diverse and fragmented society.
At the time of independence, India faced linguistic, religious, and regional divisions. The Partition, communal violence, and the princely states’ integration created a need for strong national unity. Therefore, the framers consciously designed a federation with a bias towards unity over autonomy.
This context is crucial to understanding why federalism in India is not “pure.” The Constitution is a blend of federalism with centripetal tendencies. The balance was struck not out of neglect, but out of necessity.
Another important reason for this unitary bias was economic development. India’s regions were at different levels of development, and many areas lacked basic infrastructure and services. To ensure balanced growth, the central government needed to take charge of planning and distributing resources. A weak Centre would not have been able to bridge the gap between rich and poor states or implement national policies across the country. Centralized economic planning helped promote unity through shared goals and coordinated efforts, such as the Five-Year Plans.
National security was also a major concern. India faced several challenges, including disputes with neighbouring countries, border tensions, and internal threats such as separatist movements and communal violence. In such cases, a strong central authority was needed to take quick and effective action. Allowing too much power to the states could have slowed down decision-making or led to conflicting approaches in times of crisis. The central government’s control over defence, foreign affairs, and emergency powers was seen as vital for the country’s survival and stability.
Administrative efficiency played a big role, too. Having uniform laws and policies across the country made it easier to implement large-scale national programs like education, health care, or poverty reduction. It also helped maintain consistency in governance and reduced confusion or delays. In emergencies like natural disasters, pandemics, or economic crises, a centralised system allows faster and more coordinated responses.
In short, India’s federalism is not like classic federalism because it was never meant to be. The Constitution gives powers to both the Centre and the states, but it leans in favour of the Centre in many areas. This was done to keep the country united, to ensure fair development, to protect national security, and to run the administration smoothly. The balance was struck not out of neglect or oversight, but out of practical needs and the challenges India faced at the time of independence.
Judicial Interpretation of Indian Federalism
The Supreme Court has played a critical role in shaping federalism in India.
In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Court, with a nine-bench judgment, reinforced the principles of federalism as part of the Constitution’s basic structure and emphasised cooperative federalism, thereby curbing the central government’s ability to misuse Article 356 for political purposes. The Court held that the President’s power under Article 356 is not absolute and must be exercised with great caution, in line with the views of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and the recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission. It ruled that such proclamations are subject to parliamentary approval within two months and can be reviewed by the judiciary if challenged. Importantly, the Court clarified that the floor of the Assembly, not the Governor’s opinion, is the appropriate place to test a government’s majority. While Article 356 does not directly mention dissolving a legislature, the Court inferred this power from related constitutional provisions.
Similarly, in Kuldip Nair v. Union of India, the Supreme Court addressed the removal of a domicile requirement in 2003, rejecting claims that the amendment violated the federal character. The Court held that India’s federalism is unique and tailored to the nation’s needs, differing from the U.S. model. Scholars like K.C. Wheare and D.D. Basu describe India’s system as quasi-federal, blending federal and unitary features.
In State of West Bengal v. Union of India, the Court noted that decentralization in India facilitates smooth governance but includes centralizing features. Sat Pal v. State of Punjab further highlighted India’s quasi-federal nature, citing unitary elements like single citizenship and a strong Centre. As Dr. Ambedkar remarked, the Constitution adapts to be both unitary and federal as circumstances demand.
Thus, judicial trends reflect a shift toward cooperative federalism, where the Centre and States act as partners rather than rivals.
Cooperative Federalism in Practice
Federalism is not just a structural principle, but a functional one. Indian governance today increasingly relies on cooperation between the Centre and the States, especially in schemes like:
- GST Council (joint decision-making)
- NITI Aayog (cooperative planning)
- Disaster management (Covid-19 response)
- Education and Health (shared responsibilities)
Although friction arises, especially in political terms, the practice of governance reflects a working federal model with strong central leadership.
Analysis: Author Perspective
As a first-year law student trying to understand the nature of Indian federalism, I find it difficult to label the Indian Constitution as strictly federal or purely unitary. In reality, it falls somewhere in between. It cannot be explained through traditional categories alone. It is more accurate to describe India’s system as one of “federalism with a unitary bias.” But in my opinion, this unitary tilt is not a weakness or a constitutional flaw. Rather, it is a conscious and carefully thought-out design feature that reflects the unique needs of India, a large, diverse, and historically complex country that needed a balance between national unity and regional autonomy at the time of its independence.
When I first encountered Prof. K.C. Wheare’s theory of federalism, it appeared very logical and structured. He defines federalism as a division of powers between two levels of government- central and state, each of which is independent and co-equal in its sphere. His model reflects the kind of federalism found in countries like the United States or Canada, where states or provinces originally came together voluntarily and signed agreements to create a federation. This kind of federalism expects both levels of government to be sovereign in their respective fields, without either being subordinate to the other. Wheare’s classical framework emphasises complete autonomy, especially in matters of legislation, administration, and finance.
However, as I studied more about the Indian situation, I began to question whether such a strict definition is suitable for India. India did not become a federation by the voluntary union of independent states. It was a colonial country gaining independence in 1947 after centuries of foreign rule. At that time, it faced deep divisions based on linguistic, religious, regional, and economic factors. The partition had just taken place, communal violence had erupted, and hundreds of princely states needed to be integrated into one nation. Under such circumstances, it would have been dangerous to allow too much state autonomy. Therefore, the makers of the Constitution, led by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, took a more realistic and cautious approach. They recognised the need for a strong Centre to maintain peace, unity, and coordinated development across the country.
Dr. Ambedkar’s vision of federalism was rooted in Indian realities. He admitted that the Indian Constitution does create a dual polity- Union and States, but also pointed out that the Centre had more powers in several important areas. For him, federalism was not just a mechanical arrangement of power sharing; it was a tool to achieve national integration, especially in a newly independent country with fragile unity. That is why the Constitution includes several features that allow the Centre to step in and take control when needed, such as during emergencies, in the case of failure of constitutional machinery in states (Article 356), or in matters not listed in any schedule (residuary powers under Article 248). Yet, these powers were not meant to dominate the states at all times. They were meant to be safeguards, not regular tools of governance.
Another important point that shaped my perspective is how the Constitution itself is structured. The Indian Constitution includes clear federal features. It provides for a written Constitution, a division of powers through the Seventh Schedule (Union List, State List, Concurrent List), independent state governments, an impartial judiciary, and even bicameralism at the central level through the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha. The Rajya Sabha especially, is meant to represent the interests of the states. These features are undeniably federal. But alongside them, there are unitary aspects as well: for example, the power of Parliament to change state boundaries under Article 3, the presence of All India Services like IAS and IPS, single citizenship, and the President’s emergency powers. These unitary features give the Centre a stronger hand but do not take away the identity or role of the states altogether.
What makes India’s system even more unique is its flexibility. Our federal structure is not fixed or rigid. It can bend in times of crisis and return to normal after the crisis is resolved. This flexibility is perhaps why India has managed to survive multiple political, economic, and security-related challenges without breaking apart. If we had adopted a strictly federal model like the U.S., where states cannot be reorganised or where the Centre cannot intervene even in emergencies, we might have faced serious issues of coordination and unity. Thus, the Indian model is not a weaker version of federalism; it is a stronger, more adaptive version suitable for our context.
Another key learning for me has been the concept of cooperative federalism. Although the Constitution gives the Centre more power, it does not mean that the Centre should always act unilaterally. In practice, many major national programmes, like the implementation of the Goods and Services Tax (GST), or policies related to public health, education, infrastructure, and disaster response, require close cooperation between the Centre and the states. Institutions like the GST Council and NITI Aayog show how both levels of government can work together as partners. This reflects a more dynamic, functional form of federalism that is based on dialogue and shared goals, not just written rules.
I also realised that the judiciary has played an important role in interpreting the Constitution in a way that supports federalism while maintaining balance. The S.R. Bommai case is a prime example. In this case, the Supreme Court made it clear that the power to dismiss state governments under Article 356 cannot be misused. The Court said that federalism is a basic feature of the Constitution, which cannot be altered even by Parliament. This is very significant because it protects states from arbitrary interference. Similarly, in other cases like State of West Bengal v. Union of India and Kuldip Nair v. Union of India, the Court has clarified that Indian federalism is not identical to foreign models but has been tailored to suit Indian needs.
After reflecting on all these aspects, I believe India’s Constitution does establish a federal structure, but one that is flexible, dynamic, and responsive. It is not strictly federal in the classical sense, but it is federal in spirit and in function. It respects the role of states, provides for their powers, and ensures that they have their own governments and legislative authority. At the same time, it ensures that the Centre is strong enough to hold the country together and take decisive action when needed.
India’s federalism is best seen as a “sui generis model” i.e. a one-of-a-kind system that cannot be strictly compared to any other country. It has evolved through experience, judicial guidance, and cooperative practice. As a law student, I admire the Constitution for its balance between preserving the diversity of a state as big as India and yet being united since 1947. The Constitution is federal, not because it satisfies every theoretical condition, but because it strives to balance unity with diversity in a democratic framework.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Indian Constitution is neither fully federal nor completely unitary; it is a unique mix of both. While it divides powers between the Centre and states, like a federal system, it also gives more strength to the Centre in certain areas, like a unitary system. This balance was necessary because India, at the time of independence, needed unity to stay strong while also respecting its diversity. Experts like Prof. K.C. Wheare called it “quasi-federal” because the Centre has more control compared to classic federations like the USA. However, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar defended its federal nature, arguing that a strong Centre was essential for India’s stability and growth. Today, India practices cooperative federalism, where the Centre and states work together on important issues, which shows that while the Constitution leans towards a strong Centre, states still have significant power and independence. In short, India’s federalism is special; it adapts to the country’s needs, keeping it united yet flexible. It may not fit the traditional definition of federalism, but it works for India, balancing national unity with regional diversity.