Satyam Sharma is a second (2nd) Year BALLB (Hons) student at IILM University, Greater Noida Read More
***This article has been selected for LegalOnus Law Journal (LLJ) Volume 1 Issue 10 2025
Abstract
Year after year, women’s rights activists in India have voiced their frustration over the lack of a clear legal framework to prevent domestic violence. As a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)[1], India is required by international law to implement its provisions. However, until 2005, there was a legislative gap in this area. The passing of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (herein referred as ‘DV act’) marked a significant change in the law to protect women from domestic violence. While this Act mainly aims to provide effective protection and access to justice for victims of abuse, its enactment has sparked considerable controversy, especially regarding claims of misuse and its potential use as a tool for harassment, which could result in protection for actual perpetrators of violence. This article follows the basic principles of territorial jurisdiction under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005[2] and its role in ensuring fair adjudication. It looks at the process of filing complaints within the jurisdiction of the appropriate courts and examines how well legislative intent aligns with judicial practice. The article also reviews key judicial rulings that have defined the parameters of jurisdictional inquiry, emphasizing the importance of having a solid legal framework for remedies. It attempts to analyze landmark and recent case law to identify the need for a balanced approach that does not compromise the rights of battered women while addressing the clear misuse of legal provisions. The conclusion offers comparative insights across different levels of the judiciary and provides suggestions to enhance legal clarity and effectiveness in handling domestic violence cases in Indian courts, in line with international human rights obligations.
All the rights secured to the citizens under the Constitution are worth nothing, and a mere bubble, except guaranteed to them by an independent and virtuous Judiciary.
– Andrew Jackson
Keywords: Jurisdiction, residence, DV Act
Introduction
Domestic violence is a broad social phenomenon that cuts across geographical, cultural, and economic boundaries[3]. In India, it is a serious issue that continues to haunt many women in rural and urban India. The passing of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, or the DV Act, was a significant milestone in Indian jurisprudence. It diverged from the classical criminal model of domestic violence. The DV Act created a scheme of civil law to safeguard women from domestic violence in the home and acknowledged that abuse is injurious and illegal, though not physical. The Act grants immediate, accessible, and effective relief to women who experience various types of domestic violence, such as physical, emotional, economic, and psychological abuse. One of the best features of the DV Act is that it is a victim-centered approach. It tries to tackle the reality of domestic violence and eliminate the procedural hurdles that women encounter in availing themselves of justice. One of the significant features of this is Section 27, which empowers the jurisdiction of the court to admit applications under the Act. This provision ensures that women are not hindered by geographical boundaries in seeking justice for the violence that has been done to them. Rather, it is guided by convenience, accessibility, and speedy judicial protection through various means of initiating proceedings. Section 27 of the DV Act provides that a Judicial Magistrate of First Class or a Metropolitan Magistrate is empowered to admit applications in the local area where the affected person is residing or is permanently or temporarily resident or carries on business or work. Jurisdiction can also be empowered where the respondent works, resides, or conducts business, and importantly, where the cause of action arises.
The tripartite approach in this policy reflects the legislators’ desire to construct a system that neither traps women in areas of violence nor requires undue travel or cost. The application of the term “temporarily resides” to this section has caused much controversy, mainly because of its lack of a clear-cut definition within the Domestic Violence Act or other relevant federal law. Often, there remains uncertainty as to whether or not a temporary stay, say in a relative’s home or a shelter, amounts to temporary residence. This raises issues of whether the stay has to be continuous, willful, or merely physical in nature. Even though “residence” conveys a physical habitation, the limits of duration and intent are unclear. This vagueness has been the source of problems in deciding which court of action to approach and has provided room for the abuse of jurisdictional rules to hear cases far distant from the respondent’s home. The incorporation of temporary residence as a jurisdictional component was a key legislative choice. It is congruent with the realities of women, who often must leave their marital home in distress for their protection and sustenance. By allowing such women to seek relief from the judicial system from the location where they have sought refuge on a temporary basis, the act seeks to prevent further victimization that would result if they were required to return to the locus of abuse or travel long distances to make their complaints. Additionally, this provision accounts for the fact that the victim victimized may be employed or operates a business elsewhere. This amendment is congruent with the expanding role of women within the workplace and their right to pursue justice without losing their professional commitments. The rule on the respondent’s residence, work, or business operations finds backing in general criminal law principles on territorial jurisdiction, which allow courts to exercise jurisdiction where the alleged perpetrator is present or active. In addition, the requirement of locality of the cause of action as a basis for jurisdictional determination ensures that the closest court to material events shall exercise jurisdiction, thus ensuring judicial efficiency and legitimacy.
In this way, Section 27 of DV Act fulfills the following purposes. First, it ensures that women shall not be rendered without recourse merely because of relocation from the scene of violence. Secondly, it aims to preclude respondents from evading justice through jurisdictional loopholes. Thirdly, it encourages access to justice, proximity, and equity in the legal process in domestic violence cases. However, the vagueness of the crucial term’s temporary residence and cause of action still leads to varying interpretations, which constitute a foremost area for both academic research and judicial improvement. The varying socio-economic situations of the women concerned, as well as the fluidity of domestic arrangements, add complexity to jurisdictional issues. In a social setting where work and pursuit of education frequently require women’s mobility, strict jurisdictional boundaries may undermine the intended purposes of the Act. Accordingly, a sensible and flexible interpretation of Section 27 is needed in order to preserve the DV Act’s efficacy as protective legislation.
Territorial Jurisdiction: Judicial Interpretation and Landmark Judgments
The provision that determines jurisdiction under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005[4] (herein referred to as ‘DV act’) is found in Section 27. This section gives jurisdiction to the Court of Judicial Magistrate of the First Class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, depending on where the affected person temporarily or permanently lives, works, or runs a business. This law aims to help women find legal remedies easily. However, it does not clearly define important terms like “temporary residence,” “place of business,” or “employment,” which creates confusion about how to interpret them.
The term “temporarily resides” is especially important and remains undefined, not just in the DV Act but also in general Indian law. According to Black’s Law Dictionary[5], “residence” means “a factual place of abode; living in a particular locality; it requires only bodily presence as an inhabitant of a place.” While this definition provides some insight, it does not specify what qualifies as “temporary residence” or whether a short stay can establish jurisdiction[6]. The Bombay High Court addressed this lack of clarity in the case of Afia Rasheed Khan v. Dr. Mazharuddin Ali Khan[7](herein referred to as ‘Afia Rasheed Khan’). In this case, the petitioner filed a domestic violence complaint in Mumbai, even though the alleged violence took place in Hyderabad. She had been staying briefly in a hotel and then with relatives in Mumbai before filing the complaint. The respondent contested the Mumbai court’s jurisdiction, claiming that her stay was only temporary and that she did not intend to reside there. The Court took a purpose-driven approach to interpretation, stating that laws like the DV Act should be understood in light of their goals, which is to offer effective protection to women in need.
However, it noted that this aim should not be used to justify misusing jurisdictional rules. The Court decided that a brief or casual visit[8] does not count as “temporary residence.” The residence must show some level of continuity, stability, and intention to stay, even if not forever. The Court said that staying in a hotel or any location just to start legal proceedings does not meet the requirements for temporary residence under Section 27[9].
Moreover, the Court clarified that such temporary residence should be understood as a continuous stay from when the woman begins her residence until her application under Section 12 of the Act is resolved. Based on this rationale, the Court upheld the Metropolitan Magistrate’s order, concluding that no part of the matter arose in Mumbai and that the woman’s visit was incidental, lacking an intention to reside there. This interpretation is vital in balancing access to justice for domestic violence victims while preventing abuse through forum shopping. It ensures that while the Act focuses on victims, it does not impose unfair burdens on the respondents.
The ruling in Afia Rasheed Khan is a key reference for understanding jurisdiction under the DV Act. It reinforces the idea that courts should look beyond mere physical presence and consider the true intention[10] and duration of stay. This interpretation supports the integrity of criminal procedural law and aligns with the broader goals of justice, ensuring that legal remedies remain accessible and fairly applied. Without a statutory definition, this judicial reasoning is crucial for guiding trial courts and litigants. It helps distinguish genuine complaints from those positioned for strategic advantage. While the Act’s lack of clarity allows for interpretative flexibility, the judiciary plays a key role in setting boundaries and protecting both the law’s intent and the rights of those involved. Thus, the Bombay High Court’s clarification in this case is not only legally sound but also socially aware, ensuring that the idea of temporary residence serves real justice for women affected by domestic violence. The Apex court[11], in a case of maintenance, while interpreting the phrase “resides” had observed that
“…….The said word has been subject to conflicting judicial opinion. In the Oxford Dictionary it is defined as : “dwell permanently or for a considerable time; to have one’s settled or usual abode ; to live in or at a particular lace”. The said meaning, therefore, takes in both a permanent dwelling as well as a temporary living in a place. It is, therefore, capable of different meanings, including domicile in the strictest and the most technical sense and a temporary residence. Whichever meaning is given to it, one thing is obvious and it is that it does not include a causal stay in, or a flying visit to, a particular place. In short, the meaning of the word would, in the ultimate analysis, depend upon the context and the purpose of a particular statute……….”
It is evident from this case that a casual visit will not attract the definition given in the aforesaid section[12], but rather means an intent to stay for a longer period. In another in case from Bombay High Court it was held that Temporary residence[13] means living at a location continuously for a specific reason or need, such as economic, educational, financial, cultural, or social. This arrangement lasts until the main goal is achieved[14]. There are many instances where the courts have opined on the same aspect like in Rabindra Nath Sahu & Another vs. Smt. Susila Sahu[15] held that the legislature has provided the aggrieved women who are financially, economically or physically abused wide options to institute a case which best suited their convenience, comfort and accessibility, though living in a temporary residence, she can seek reliefs under this act; in Sharad Kumar Pandey vs Mamta Pandey[16] a case from Delhi High Court wherein it was held that the provisions of the DV act are made such that the aggrieved person who has been abandoned by her family and compelled to take residence in urgency though temporarily with relatives or friends where she was not subject to harassment and cruelty or she shifts herself to another place to take job and shift her residence. This temporary residence does not any other place with an intent to file a complaint in a faraway area by booking a hotel and etc. Even though finding plethora of cases but still it would depend upon the evidence being submitted and facts of the particular case.
In a landmark judicial decision[17] that had a significant impact on the jurisprudence of Section 27 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the courts were faced with a complex case where the complainant had been subjected to domestic cruelty in the territorial jurisdictions outside India. While the cruelty was not committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court where the complaint was filed, the complainant had also made India her permanent residence at her parental residence due to the very ill-treatment she had been subjected to outside India. Her physical and mental health had been significantly undermined in the long term, with the trauma even continuing when she returned to India. In applying Section 27, the argument was that her present residence—her parental residence—was a valid ground of jurisdiction, with regard to the fact that the effects of the cruelty she had suffered continued beyond the location of the initial acts and continued to affect her well-being and daily life at the place where she was residing. This judicial interpretation was authoritatively reaffirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rupali Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others[18] (referred to as ‘Rupali Devi’), where the Court extended the jurisdictional scope under Section 27 by resorting to the continuing effects of cruelty, irrespective of the location of the original act. The Court held that the mental anguish, trauma, and emotional agony arising from domestic violence do not remain confined to the location of the act but continue to affect and manifest at the location where the aggrieved woman takes shelter, keeping in mind particularly that such recourse is necessitated by undesirable circumstances. The Court made it clear that a limited definition of jurisdiction would vitiate the very essence of the DV Act, which seeks to grant effective, proximate, and immediate redress to women who undergo abuse and abandonment. The Rupali Devi judgment has therefore established an important precedent: that the “effects” of cruelty must be accorded the same legal consideration as the “acts” of cruelty[19]. The Court made it clear that the sufferings endured at the new home—particularly when it becomes the sole asylum of the aggrieved woman—is not a sequel but a continuation of the violence perpetrated against her. The woman’s present and permanent residence, therefore, even if geographically far from the location of abuse, is a competent and valid jurisdiction for the lodging of a complaint under the DV Act. Recognition of residual and continuing suffering at a new location ensures that victims are not left remediless on account of the technicalities of jurisdiction. Subsequent judgments have reaffirmed this test, holding that the DV Act must be interpreted to further the protective and remedial intent intended by the legislature. The courts have always emphasized that jurisdictional provisions under Section 27 must not be interpreted narrowly, but rather to further justice, where the change of residence by the aggrieved woman is a direct fallout of the domestic violence suffered by her[20]. Justice (Retd.) R. Banumathi[21] of Supreme Court have extensively dealt with this matter as above mentioned and reiterated ratio decidendi – a straightforward reading of Section 27(1)(a) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, indicates that a petition under the Act can be filed in a court where the “person aggrieved” either lives, works, or runs a business, whether permanently or temporarily. In this case, the respondent stays with her parents in the area of the Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Bengaluru. Therefore, the court can hear the complaint and acknowledge the alleged offense. As a result, the objection regarding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Magistrate Court in Bengaluru is not valid and cannot stand in law.
Apart from granting an aggrieved person the right to approach a case under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 at her place of permanent residence or her temporary residence, Section 27 of the Act also extends the jurisdictional parameters in two important areas[22]. Firstly, it provides for the filing of a complaint in a court within the local jurisdiction of the area where the respondent is living, working, or carrying on business. This requirement ensures that jurisdiction is not confined to the physical presence of the aggrieved person but provides elasticity to tackle the realities of domestic life where the parties might be living apart due to estrangement or professional obligations. Secondly, and more importantly, this requirement identifies the cause of action locale as a legitimate basis for determining jurisdiction. This includes any place where any part of the alleged domestic violence or its consequences occurred. By identifying the cause of action locale, the law enables courts to determine jurisdiction on the basis of the origin or perpetuation of the offense, rather than the present positions of the parties. All three sub-clauses in Section 27 of the DV Act together demonstrate the intent of the legislature to enhance a victim-centric approach, lessening procedural barriers and making it possible for aggrieved women to seek justice in the forum that is most convenient and relevant to her lived experiences. The built-in flexibility in these jurisdictional choices serves to facilitate the remedial goals of the DV Act, and thus, in turn, reasserts the notion that justice must be both accessible and effective in addressing cases of domestic violence[23].
Conclusion
The Domestic Violence Act, 2005 was passed as a forward-looking and curative legislation with the purpose of extending immediate, effective, and accessible legal recourse to women victims of domestic violence. Among its several procedural protections, Section 27 of DV Act is a significant provision to ensure that jurisdictional formalities do not stand in the way of seeking justice[24].
By providing an aggrieved woman with the option of instituting proceedings from her permanent residence or her temporary residence, or from the place where the respondent is residing, working, carrying on business, or where the cause of action arises[25], the legislature has taken a conscious policy decision to take a flexible and victim-centric approach. But the failure to provide statutory definitions of the term “temporary residence” has led to interpretative uncertainties and jurisdictional disputes before the courts.
Through judicial endeavors over the years, a purposive interpretation of this provision has evolved, balancing the rights of the aggrieved woman to safety and convenience on one hand and the prevention of forum shopping and abuse of procedure on the other hand. The doctrine of temporary residence, as interpreted, requires more than a tactical or casual visit; it must be an intent to reside with continuity and purpose. This study has found that the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 27 of DV Act must be contextual, fact-sensitive, and guided by the overall purpose of the DV Act—to empower and enable victims of domestic violence. While so doing, the canons of natural justice must be safeguarded to ensure fair treatment of the respondent[26]. In the future, it is necessary that the courts use a balanced, purposive, and evidence-based approach to dealing with jurisdictional objections, while the legislature can consider the prospect of introducing clarificatory amendments in the interest of uniform interpretation. Ultimately, the effective enforcement of Section 27 is not only a technical imperative, but it also demonstrates the dedication of the legal system to the protection of the dignity, security, and constitutional rights of women in domestic law.
It is the spirit and not the form of law that keeps justice alive.
-
Earl Warren[27]
[1] Adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly
[2] ACT NO. 43 OF 2005
[3] Hornbeck, A., Johnson, B., LaGrotta, M. and Sellman, K., 2006. The Protection of Women form Domestic Violence Act: Solution or Mere Paper Tiger. Loy. U. Chi. Int’l L. Rev., 4, p.273.
[4] The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (Act No. 43 Of 2005)
[5] [5] Black’s Law Dictionary by Henry Campbell, revised Fourth Edition by The Publishers Editorial Staff St. Paul, Minn. West Publishing Co. 1968.
[6] Makharia, A., 2023. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005: A Critical Overview. Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Science, 11(3), pp.278-296.
[7] 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 4605, Para 10 to 15; K.C. Vijayakumara ss Smt. S. Geetha Criminal Revision Petition No.1377 Of 2018 (High Court of Karnataka)
[8] Nithoniel Nayak and others vs Mimansa Sinha CRLREV No.537 of 2024 (High Court of Orissa)
[9] Das, P.K., 2011. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence. Universal Law Publishing.
[10] Rabindra Nath Sahu & Another Vs. Smt. Susila Sahu 2016 SCC OnLine Ori 592, it was held that there must be a concrete intent to live apart from the dwelling house for a significant period of time and not to for the purpose of filing case.
[11] Jagirkaur and another v. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1963 SC 1541
[12] Darshan Kumari (Smt.) vs. Surendra Kumar 1995 Supp.(4) SCC 137.
[13] Shikha Lall v Prince Agarwal, CRL.REV.P. 203/2021 & CRL.M.A. 27013/2023 (High Court of Delhi)
[14] Prashant s/o Manmohanjhi Laddha Vs. Sau Madhuri w/o Prashant Laddha; 2018 ALL MR (Cri) 2971
[15] 2016 SCC OnLine Ori 592
[16] 2010 (118) DRJ 625 Para 8.
[17] X v Y, Criminal Application (Apl.) No. 1576 OF 2022 – Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench
[18] AIR 2019 SC 1790
[19] Id. Para 15
[20] State of M.P. v. Suresh Kaushal & Anr. (2003) 11 SCC 126- It was contended that the court to be set up at the site of the house of the wife’s parents would be able to entertain the complaint, as per the provisions made under Section 179 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.); Also read Mubashir Ahmad Wani v. Meelaz Mubashir & Anr. CM(M) No.287/2022 (High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh);
[21] In the case of
[22] Section 27 of DV Act (1) (b) & (1) (c).
[23] One of the landmark judgment from Bombay High Court- Kaushal Arvind Thakker v Jyoti Kaushal & Anr. 2024:BHC-AS:14279; Shyamlal Devda and Ors. vs. Parimala MANU/SC/0067/2020.
[24] Nigam, S., 2019. Women and domestic violence law in India: a quest for justice. Routledge India.
[25] Ghosh, B. and Choudhuri, T., 2011. Legal protection against domestic violence in India: scope and limitations. Journal of family violence, 26(4), pp.319-330.
[26] Karanjawala, T. and Chugh, S., 2009. The legal battle against domestic violence in India: Evolution and analysis. International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, 23(3), pp.289-308.
[27] American attorney and politician who served as the 30th governor of California from 1943 to 1953 and as the 14th chief justice of the United States from 1953 to 1969
