Guna Sai Venkat Jagatha is a fourth-year B.A LL.B student at Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University, Delhi. Read More
Introduction
The case of Shankari Prasad vs. Union of India (1951) is a cornerstone in Indian constitutional law, marking the Supreme Court’s first engagement with the boundaries of Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution. Decided just a year after India’s First Amendment, this case set the stage for a long-standing debate on whether Parliament could modify fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution.
In 1951, India was grappling with pressing social and economic reforms, particularly in land redistribution. To expedite these reforms, the government passed the First Amendment, which added Articles 31A and 31B. These articles allowed certain land reform laws to bypass judicial scrutiny by placing them in the Ninth Schedule—making them immune to challenges on the grounds of violating fundamental rights, specifically the right to property under Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31. Shankari Prasad, the petitioner, contended that this amendment violated these fundamental rights, arguing that the government could not tamper with Part III of the Constitution.
The primary issues before the Court were
- whether Parliament had the authority to amend fundamental rights and
- if an amendment under Article 368 qualified as “law” within the meaning of Article 13(2), which prohibits the state from making laws infringing upon fundamental rights.
The Court’s judgment in Shankari Prasad upheld Parliament’s power to amend fundamental rights, setting a critical precedent that shaped subsequent constitutional challenges, including the later cases of Golak Nath vs. State of Punjab (1967) and Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala (1973).
Background and Context
After gaining independence in 1947, India faced immense social and economic challenges, particularly in the redistribution of land, which was concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy landlords. The government sought to implement comprehensive land reform to address rural inequality and promote social justice. However, these reforms often clashed with the constitutional protection of the right to property, which was recognized as a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 of the Constitution. This clash necessitated the First Amendment to the Constitution in 1951, which was introduced to prevent land reform laws from being struck down as unconstitutional.
The First Amendment introduced Articles 31A and 31B, which aimed to protect laws intended for agrarian reform from judicial scrutiny. Article 31A provided that certain categories of laws relating to land redistribution would not be deemed invalid on the grounds of contravening the right to property. Meanwhile, Article 31B created the Ninth Schedule, a provision that protected specific laws from being challenged in court on grounds of violating fundamental rights. Laws placed in the Ninth Schedule, which initially included several land reform statutes, were insulated from judicial review.
The amendment was immediately controversial and faced legal challenges. Shankari Prasad, a citizen affected by the agrarian reforms, filed a petition questioning the constitutionality of the First Amendment. He argued that fundamental rights, as guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution, formed an unalterable foundation that could not be amended, even by Parliament. According to Shankari Prasad, the government’s action violated Article 13(2), which states, “The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part.” He contended that “law” in Article 13(2) included constitutional amendments, meaning that amendments infringing on fundamental rights were prohibited.
This legal challenge brought to the forefront two crucial constitutional questions: (1) whether Parliament had the power to amend fundamental rights and (2) whether an amendment under Article 368, the article granting Parliament its amending powers, qualified as a “law” under Article 13(2). The case thus centered on defining the extent of Parliament’s amending authority and the sanctity of fundamental rights.
This initial confrontation between parliamentary sovereignty and the judicial safeguarding of fundamental rights laid the groundwork for subsequent landmark cases, including Golak Nath vs. State of Punjab (1967) and Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala (1973), which further clarified and defined the limits of Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution.
The Legal Challenge
In Shankari Prasad vs. Union of India, the petitioner, Shankari Prasad, mounted a significant legal challenge to the First Amendment, arguing that it infringed upon fundamental rights, specifically the right to property under Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31. The petitioner’s main contention was that Parliament could not amend Part III of the Constitution, which enshrines fundamental rights, as these rights are integral to individual freedoms and form the Constitution’s “basic structure.”
At the core of this case was the interpretation of Article 368, which grants Parliament the power to amend the Constitution. Shankari Prasad argued that this power was not absolute, particularly concerning fundamental rights. His argument hinged on Article 13(2), which states that “the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part [Part III of the Constitution].” The petitioner posited that an amendment was also a form of “law” and should therefore be subject to the restrictions outlined in Article 13(2). In essence, he argued that Parliament could not override or amend fundamental rights without violating Article 13(2).
Shankari Prasad’s interpretation implied that fundamental rights held a superior position within the constitutional framework and were immune to amendment. He argued that the framers of the Constitution intended these rights to be permanent and unalterable, protecting them from the whims of legislative changes.
The government, on the other hand, argued that the power to amend the Constitution, including fundamental rights, was inherent in Article 368. They contended that an amendment was not akin to an ordinary “law” under Article 13(2) but rather a sovereign function of Parliament. The government’s position was that Article 368 conferred on Parliament the plenary power to amend any part of the Constitution, including Part III. This interpretation would allow Parliament to respond to changing social and economic needs, such as the land reform legislation at issue in this case.
The case thus revolved around two competing interpretations of constitutional authority: whether Parliament’s power under Article 368 included the ability to amend fundamental rights, or whether such rights were protected from alteration by the restriction in Article 13(2). The Supreme Court was called upon to resolve this fundamental question and clarify the scope of Parliament’s amending power in relation to the inviolability of fundamental rights, a decision that would profoundly shape India’s constitutional jurisprudence in the years to come.
The Supreme Court’s Judgment
In Shankari Prasad vs. Union of India (1951), the Supreme Court of India delivered a pivotal judgment upholding Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution, including fundamental rights. The five-judge bench, led by Chief Justice Harilal Jekisundas Kania, faced the essential question of whether the First Amendment, which introduced Articles 31A and 31B to protect land reform laws from judicial scrutiny, was constitutionally valid. The Court’s interpretation of Article 368 and Article 13(2) laid the foundation for the limits and extent of Parliament’s amending power.
Key Aspects of the Judgment
The Court primarily focused on the meaning and scope of Article 368, which grants Parliament the power to amend the Constitution, and Article 13(2), which prohibits the State from making any “law” that infringes upon fundamental rights. The Court held that an amendment under Article 368 was not an ordinary “law” within the meaning of Article 13(2) and therefore could not be challenged on the grounds of violating fundamental rights.
- Interpretation of Article 368:
The Court ruled that Article 368 confers a plenary power on Parliament to amend the Constitution, including Part III, which contains fundamental rights. It held that there was no restriction on the types of amendments Parliament could make, provided the amendment process prescribed in Article 368 was followed. According to the Court, the framers of the Constitution had intentionally included Article 368 to allow Parliament the flexibility to adapt the Constitution to meet evolving social and economic needs. This interpretation meant that fundamental rights could be amended just like any other part of the Constitution, giving Parliament the power to respond to changing circumstances without being bound by the original framework of Part III.
- Article 13(2) and the Definition of “Law”:
The Court addressed Shankari Prasad’s argument that Article 13(2) prohibited any “law” from infringing on fundamental rights, including constitutional amendments. The Court disagreed, holding that the word “law” in Article 13(2) referred to ordinary laws, not amendments under Article 368. By this reasoning, a constitutional amendment was not constrained by Article 13(2) and could not be invalidated on the basis that it curtailed fundamental rights. This distinction was crucial, as it placed constitutional amendments beyond the scope of judicial review under Article 13, allowing Parliament to amend fundamental rights if it chose to.
- Precedent for Legislative Supremacy:
The judgment reinforced the principle of legislative supremacy in amending the Constitution, setting a precedent for future cases. The Court’s decision reflected a belief that elected representatives in Parliament held the mandate to determine the scope and nature of rights in the Constitution, aligning with democratic principles and the need for flexibility in governance. This ruling empowered Parliament to enact constitutional changes to address pressing issues, such as agrarian reform, without judicial interference, so long as the amendment process in Article 368 was observed.
Immediate and Long-Term Impact
The Court’s judgment in Shankari Prasad had an immediate impact, allowing the government to proceed with land reforms without the threat of judicial invalidation. This decision was also a foundational precedent for subsequent cases that questioned Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution, including Golak Nath vs. State of Punjab (1967) and Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala (1973).
However, in Golak Nath, the Court reversed its stance, ruling that Parliament could not amend fundamental rights, which introduced a new phase in the debate over constitutional amendability. Ultimately, the Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati (1973) established the Basic Structure Doctrine, which allowed Parliament to amend the Constitution but prohibited amendments that altered its fundamental framework.
The Shankari Prasad judgment remains a significant milestone, demonstrating the Court’s early inclination to uphold Parliament’s sovereignty in constitutional matters. This case laid the groundwork for the evolution of the Basic Structure Doctrine, a doctrine that would later balance parliamentary power with judicial oversight to protect core constitutional values.
Analysis of the Judgment
The Supreme Court’s decision in Shankari Prasad vs. Union of India (1951) is often regarded as a foundational case that shaped the early relationship between parliamentary power and judicial oversight in India’s constitutional framework. The judgment underscored Parliament’s authority to amend the Constitution, including fundamental rights, setting a precedent for the interpretation of Article 368 and Article 13(2). However, this decision has also sparked extensive debate over the years, with both support and criticism regarding its implications for the sanctity of fundamental rights and democratic governance.
Judicial Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy
In interpreting Article 368, the Court affirmed that the Constitution provides Parliament with wide-ranging powers to amend any part of the document, including Part III, which enshrines fundamental rights. The Supreme Court’s decision reflected a judicial deference to legislative authority, suggesting that elected representatives should have the flexibility to adapt constitutional provisions to meet changing socio-economic conditions. This perspective aligns with democratic principles, implying that Parliament, as a representative body, has the mandate to make constitutional changes, especially those aimed at promoting social and economic justice, such as land reforms.
However, this stance has raised questions about the potential overreach of parliamentary power. By allowing Parliament to amend fundamental rights, the judgment in Shankari Prasad seemed to suggest that even core individual freedoms could be altered by a simple majority amendment. This interpretation laid the foundation for the debate on whether certain elements of the Constitution—specifically fundamental rights—should be safeguarded from amendment to prevent misuse of power.
Fundamental Rights as “Ordinary” Constitutional Provisions
The Court’s interpretation of Article 13(2) was critical in establishing the view that constitutional amendments are distinct from ordinary laws. By ruling that the term “law” in Article 13(2) referred only to ordinary legislation and not to amendments under Article 368, the Court essentially removed amendments from judicial review on the grounds of violating fundamental rights. This interpretation, while technically sound, was criticized for potentially weakening the protective shield around Part III, as it allowed amendments to fundamental rights without judicial scrutiny.
The idea that fundamental rights could be amended just like any other provision of the Constitution was a departure from the notion that they are sacrosanct guarantees of individual liberty. Many constitutional scholars and legal thinkers argue that fundamental rights should hold a higher status within the constitutional hierarchy, limiting Parliament’s power to alter or remove them. This perspective eventually gained traction in later cases, leading to the establishment of the Basic Structure Doctrine in Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala (1973).
Criticisms and Alternative Interpretations
Critics of the Shankari Prasad judgment argue that the decision tilted too heavily in favor of parliamentary supremacy, potentially compromising individual freedoms. By allowing amendments to fundamental rights without any judicial review, the Court risked placing crucial liberties at the mercy of transient legislative majorities. In contrast, later judgments like Golak Nath vs. State of Punjab (1967) took a different stance, asserting that fundamental rights are unamendable and form an essential part of the Constitution’s identity.
In Golak Nath, the Court overruled Shankari Prasad, holding that Parliament did not have the power to amend Part III, as fundamental rights were integral to the Constitution’s core framework. This decision marked a shift toward judicial protection of fundamental rights, indicating a more cautious approach to parliamentary power.
Legacy and Influence on the Basic Structure Doctrine
The Shankari Prasad ruling is historically significant as it laid the groundwork for later discussions on constitutional amendments, culminating in the Basic Structure Doctrine established in Kesavananda Bharati. This doctrine, which holds that Parliament can amend the Constitution but cannot alter its “basic structure,” represents a compromise between parliamentary authority and judicial oversight. The Shankari Prasad judgment, while supportive of legislative supremacy, indirectly contributed to the evolution of this doctrine, as it highlighted the need for checks on Parliament’s power to safeguard essential constitutional values.
In retrospect, Shankari Prasad vs. Union of India stands as a landmark decision that ignited a critical dialogue on the balance of power within the Indian democracy, shaping the constitutional landscape and ensuring that fundamental rights retain their special status within the structure of Indian law.
Legacy and Subsequent Challenges
The legacy of Shankari Prasad vs. Union of India (1951) is profound, as it established the precedent for Parliament’s authority to amend the Constitution, including fundamental rights. This judgment, which upheld legislative supremacy, created a framework for future constitutional interpretation. However, the decision also left a lingering question about whether any limits existed on Parliament’s power, particularly regarding the sanctity of fundamental rights. This question resurfaced in subsequent landmark cases, leading to significant developments in constitutional law.
Golak Nath vs. State of Punjab (1967)
The Golak Nath case represented the first major challenge to the Shankari Prasad precedent. In this case, the Supreme Court reversed its earlier position, ruling that Parliament could not amend fundamental rights under Article 368. The Court, led by Chief Justice Subba Rao, held that fundamental rights were a “transcendental position” in the Constitution and could not be altered through the amending power. The Court reasoned that Articles 13(2) and 368 should be read together, which implied that fundamental rights were beyond the reach of constitutional amendments.
This judgment was a bold departure from Shankari Prasad and emphasized the inviolability of fundamental rights. It curtailed Parliament’s power, asserting that amendments infringing on these rights would be invalid. The ruling was intended to protect individual liberties, yet it generated criticism for limiting Parliament’s ability to address pressing social issues through constitutional reforms.
Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala (1973) and the Basic Structure Doctrine
The clash between parliamentary power and judicial protection of fundamental rights reached its peak in the landmark case of Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala (1973). In this case, the Supreme Court revisited the scope of Article 368 and established the Basic Structure Doctrine, which became the ultimate check on Parliament’s amending power. The Court ruled that while Parliament could amend any part of the Constitution, it could not alter its “basic structure,” which includes the core principles and foundational framework of the Constitution.
This doctrine provided a middle ground between the unrestricted power upheld in Shankari Prasad and the stringent limits imposed in Golak Nath. It allowed Parliament to amend fundamental rights but prohibited amendments that would destroy or alter the Constitution’s basic structure. The Basic Structure Doctrine has since served as a powerful tool for the judiciary to protect essential constitutional values and prevent legislative overreach.
Enduring Significance
The Shankari Prasad judgment, though initially granting Parliament sweeping powers, indirectly contributed to the development of the Basic Structure Doctrine by highlighting the need for limits on amendability. Subsequent cases, particularly Indira Nehru Gandhi vs. Raj Narain (1975) and Minerva Mills vs. Union of India (1980), further strengthened the doctrine and cemented judicial oversight over amendments.
In retrospect, Shankari Prasad vs. Union of India marks the beginning of India’s constitutional evolution, setting in motion a series of legal interpretations that sought to balance parliamentary sovereignty with the protection of fundamental rights. This legacy underscores the dynamic nature of constitutional law in India, emphasizing the judiciary’s role in safeguarding democratic values while respecting the powers granted to Parliament.
Shankari Prasad in Modern Constitutional Law
In modern constitutional law, Shankari Prasad vs. Union of India (1951) remains significant for its early assertion of Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution, including fundamental rights. Although later judgments, particularly Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala (1973), introduced limits to this power through the Basic Structure Doctrine, Shankari Prasad is still recognized as the foundational case that sparked India’s exploration of constitutional amendability.
The Shankari Prasad ruling laid the groundwork for understanding how much authority Parliament holds over the Constitution, which has shaped modern debates on constitutional amendments. For instance, the Court’s reasoning that amendments are distinct from ordinary “law” under Article 13(2) has influenced subsequent judgments by reinforcing the special status of amendments under Article 368. This distinction remains relevant, as recent cases continue to grapple with the extent of Parliament’s power to enact changes, especially when amendments affect fundamental rights or alter democratic structures.
The Basic Structure Doctrine, developed in Kesavananda Bharati, introduced a lasting limit on Parliament’s amending power, asserting that certain core principles, such as democracy, secularism, and judicial review, are beyond legislative alteration. This doctrine was reinforced in cases like Indira Nehru Gandhi vs. Raj Narain (1975) and Minerva Mills vs. Union of India (1980), where the Court struck down amendments violating the basic structure. In this sense, Shankari Prasad is often cited as a precursor to these checks on legislative power.
In recent times, the principles emerging from Shankari Prasad have been invoked in debates over constitutional integrity, especially when amendments aim to expand or limit individual rights. This case, while granting Parliament broad powers, ultimately contributed to the robust constitutional framework that now balances flexibility with the preservation of core democratic values, illustrating the evolving dynamic between legislative power and judicial safeguards in India’s constitutional law.
Conclusion
The landmark case of Shankari Prasad vs. Union of India (1951) established the foundation for Parliament’s authority to amend the Constitution, even to the extent of modifying fundamental rights. This judgment, which emphasized legislative supremacy, set a precedent for interpreting Article 368 broadly, allowing Parliament to adapt the Constitution to meet changing societal needs. However, the decision’s implications also sparked a crucial debate on the balance between amending power and the sanctity of fundamental rights.
Over time, cases like Golak Nath vs. State of Punjab (1967) and Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala (1973) introduced checks on this power, with the latter establishing the Basic Structure Doctrine as a limit to prevent amendments that would alter the Constitution’s essential framework. This doctrine, now a cornerstone of Indian constitutional law, protects core principles, ensuring that amendments cannot undermine India’s democratic foundations.
Today, Shankari Prasad endures as a pivotal case in India’s constitutional journey, underscoring the evolving relationship between Parliament and the judiciary. It laid the groundwork for a legal framework that balances legislative flexibility with judicial oversight, preserving the integrity of fundamental rights while allowing the Constitution to adapt to new challenges in a dynamic society.
References and Further Reading
- Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 458.
- Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643.
- Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461.
- Seervai, H. M. Constitutional Law of India. Universal Law Publishing.
- Basu, Durga Das. Commentary on the Constitution of India. LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa.
